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Abstract.
The study's investigation focuses on the role played by the NCOP in the national
legislature as the second chamber of parliament. It looks in particular at how the
NCOP has managed in its deliberations, and as mandated by the Constitution to
represent provinces. Subsection 42 (4) of the Constitution stipulates that; " The NCOP
represent the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in
the national sphere of government" (RSA Act 108, 1996).
The question that the study seeks to answer IS: does the National Council of
Provinces in its deliberations work to represent the interests of provinces in the
national legislature rather than those of the party in control of the province? In
answering the research question the study's approach is qualitative in nature. In other
words, data collection methods were confined to documents and other important
sources such as NCOP Publications namely, the NCOP News and the NCOP Review.
Looking at the literature on second chambers, the study found that for second
chambers to play an effective role in the legislature, the Constitution must equip them
with adequate legislative powers. This means that the Constitution must give second
chambers a veto on all Bills affecting their jurisdictions. Where a veto is non existent,
irrespective of what legislative powers a second chamber may posses, if not elected
directly by the electorate, it will suffer the accusations of rubber stamping Bills passed
by the first house.
The NCOP falls in the same category of second houses with no veto over Bills
affecting provinces. Its legislative powers on these Bills are blunted by the NA's two-
thirds majority in the legislature and as a result remain a subordinate of the first house
and that of the ruling party. Furthermore, administrative and communication problems
experienced by the institution hinder it in its role of representing provinces. Equally
so, the dominance of the ruling ANC in the provinces makes it difficult to determine
whether mandates delivered by provincial legislatures carry the interests of provinces
or those of the party in power.
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Opsomming.
Die studie-ondersoek is geng op die rol wat die NRVP (Nasionale Raad Van
Provinsies), as die tweede huis van die Parlement. Die werk is spesifiek gerig op die
manier hoe die NRVP vaar in hul debatvoerings, asook in hul verteenwoordiging van
provinsies soos voorgeskryf in die Grondwet. Sub-artikel 42 (4) van die grondwet
stipuleer dat "die NRVP verteenwoordig die provinsies om te verseker dat provinsiale
belange in ag geneem word op die nasionale sfeer van die regering." (RSA Wet 108
van 1996).
Die vraag wat hierdie studie poog om te antwoord, is die volgende: wark die NRVP in
hul debatsvoerings om die belange van die provinsies in die nasionale wetgewer te
verteenwoordig inplaas van die belange van die party in beheer van 'n spesifieke
provinsie? In die beantwoording van hierdie navorsings-vraag, is die studie
benadering kwalitatief in aard. Met ander woorde - data invorderings metodes was
beperk tot dokumente en ander belangrike bronne soos NRVP publikasies, naamlik
die "NCOP News" en die "NCOP Review".
Na 'n bestudering van literatuur rondom die tweede huis van Parlement, het hierdie
studie bevind dat vir die tweede huis om 'n effektiewe rol te speel in die wetgewer,
die Grondwet dit moet toerus met genoegsame wetgewende magte. Dit beteken onder
andere dat die grondwet die tweede huis 'n veto-reg gee oor alle wetsontwerpe wat
hulle juridiksie raak. Waar 'n veto-reg nie bestaan nie, ongeag die wetgewende mag
wat die NRVP mag hê, sal dit bieg gebuk gaan onder die beskuldiging dat dit 'n
rubberstempel plaas op wetsontwerpe uitgevaardig deur die Nasionale Vergadering.
Die NRVP val in dieselfde katagorie van tweede huise wat nie 'n veto-reg het oor
wetsontwerpe wat provinsies raak. Die NRVP se wetgewende mag oor hierdie
wetsonwerpe word geskoei op die Nasionale Vergadering se twee-derde meerderheid
en gevolglik bly dit ondergeskik aan die Nasionale Vergadering. Verder,
administratiewe-en kommunikasie-probleme wat ondervind word deur die liggaam,
hinder dit in die rol van verteenwoordiger van die provinsies. Gelykstaande hieraan, is
die dominering van die bewindvoerende party - die ANC. In die provinsies is dit
III
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moeilik om vas te stelof die voorskrifte van die provinsiale wetgewer werklik handel
oor die belange van die provinsies self of die is van die party in die meerderheid.
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CHAPTER ONE.
INTRODUCTION.
1. Problem statement.
There's generally little attention paid to parliament and in particular how it functions.
Often we hear of parliament when either a member is involved in a scandal ora
controversial Bill is under discussion. Other than that most of the general public know
very little about parliament - its workings and component machinery. I refer in
particular to the two chambers of parliament, namely the National Assembly (NA)
and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). The latter being the least talked about
in political and academic circles.
Indeed, the role and significance of the NCOP in parliament remains one of the major
challenges facing South Africa's new political system. "As a completely new
institution, the NCOP must contend with the fact that few South Africans understand
it. It has little to no profile in the public. Its role, purpose and raison d'etre are little
understood - by citizens, by provincial legislatures, by members of the National
Assembly and even by the delegates themselves" (Christina Murray, 1997:4). Not
only the institution suffers because of its novelty, related to that is the fact that many
MPLs lack the skills, knowledge and support necessary to deal with provincial
legislative matters, making their roles in the NCOP less effective and from a
provincial point of view unrepresentative.
The whole matter revolves around the NCOP's central role as defined by the
constitution - that of representing the interest of provinces. In practice, there seem to
be an overlapping tendency between the interest of provinces and those of political
parties. The DA MPL in the Gauteng legislature pointed this out when he said that
delegates must be able to articulate and" ... negotiate between a party position and the
perspectives of the province, and where there is a divergence of opinions between the
view of the delegate's party and the mandate of the province, the delegate must
morally and ethically be bound to represent the mandate given to him or her by the
province" (NeOp News, 1999:4). The former Chairperson of the NCOP, Mosiua
Lekota reiterated by saying, "many of the Premiers are very shy to come here and
challenge cabinet ministers in the same party with them because of party loyalty, they
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prefer to raise these issues in the confidentiality of party structures and resolve them
there (Parliamentary Whip, June 1998:4).
As a body designed to promote the interests of provinces, the NCOP finds itself
caught between two distinct roles. First, the Constitution states that the NCOP's role
is to represent provinces. The same Constitution expects all spheres of governance,
namely national, provincial and local to recognise the concept of intergovernmental
relations. Where all government spheres work together to recognise the indivisability
of the Republic in what is regarded as a unitary state. In view of all the above the
question is; how does the NCOP manage to represent the different interests of
provinces without undermining the indivisability of the Republic.
The above questions constitute the bedrock upon which the study's trajectory will be
directed. The point of departure is whether the NCOP as a representative of provincial
legislatures at national level is able to fulfill this role. Since under the present
circumstances it is difficult to tell whether the NCOP does indeed represent the
interests of provinces than those of political parties in control of provinces.
1.2 Purpose and significance of the study.
The purpose of the study seek to address the question of provincial interests and the
role of the NCOP in representing provinces. In other words, does the NCOP on its
deleberations work to ensure that national laws take provincial interests into account.
Put somewhat differently, do provinces make full use of the opportunity afforded
them by the constitution to participate in the formulation of national policy.
Furthermore, the purpose of the study is therefore to provide clarity on the NCOP's
role as the second house of the national legislature. And whether the body has been
successful in creating conditions for provinces to evaluate legislative proposals
emanating from the national executive against those that prevail at provincial level.
To elucidate whether the concept of the NCOP forms part of the democratic process
envisaged in the constitution. Where power is decentralised and provinces are active
participants in the law-making process at national level.
2
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Accordingly, the study is significant in two respects. First it contributes to an
understanding of the NCOP as the second chamber of parliament. Secondly it gives
insight to the workings of the NCOP as a representative body of provinces. Thirdly,
the study brings under the spotlight the constitutional mandate given the NCOP vis-a-
vis provincial interests. Furthermore, the study can be regarded as an evaluation of
what transpired from the negotiation process at Kempton Park regarding provinces.
According to Chaskalson & Spitz (2000: 122), "At the heart of the debate over
provinces laid the question of the fornr of state, which was fundamental both to
negotiators and to the future constitutional dispensation" . Has the NCOP therefore
managed to give shape, clarity and meaning to that form of state?
Equally so, the study attempts to measure the distance travelled from the old Senate to
the newly created NCOP. Whether the NCOP has overcome the "rubber-stamping"
stigma once attached to the old Senate. According to Ngcuka, the NCOP former
deputy chairperson; "the Senate tended to be a mirror image of the National
Assembly. It tended to duplicate what was happening in the National
Assembly ..."(NCOP Review, 1994-1999). Representing no one and accountable only
to party structures. The question that need to be answered is, has the NCOP
transformed the role of the second house or has it " become like a senate with knobs
on?" (NCOP Debates, 2000:1230). In other words, with the appearance of something
different while doing the same thing it was set to rectify.
1.3 Research Methods.
1.3.1 Data collection methods.
The study's approach is qualitative 111 nature and geared to promote better
understanding and insight to the NCOP's constitutional mandate in promoting
provincial interests. The study begins with certain theoretical approaches to second
houses from which, over the course of the research, specific lines of inquiry such as
legislative powers of second houses are explored (Bridgman, 1999:38). It is often a
qualitative approach that allows researchers this flexibility while also giving them the
confidence that they have really understood what they are studying (Brandt, 2001: 11).
In addition to the above qualitative research has been advocated as the best strategy
for exploring new or unknown phenomenon for better understanding.
3
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Thus, answering the research question will require the use of documents and sources
of data will revolve around parliamentary papers compiled in the form of Bills tabled
before parliament. These sources will include NeOp Publications (eg NCOP News,
Reviews, etc) which will be augmented by other sources outside of parliament such as
newspaper articles, commissioned reports and conference papers by NGO's and/or
research institutions whose subject matter is the NeOp or provincial interests. The
choice of using documents stem from the following three justifications. Firstly,
documents are important as a domain of signification or as Dorothy Smith in Mouton
(1999:120) put it as "textual reality". This then make it easier for the researcher to
analyse political phenomenon as "textual reality" by the use of documents through the
preservation of records (Johnson & Joslyn,1995:252). Secondly, those writing and
preserving the records are often unaware of any future research goal or hypothesis,
which then eliminate biases from the records. Thirdly, a researcher using document
analysis often save himself or herself some considerable time. For indeed, it is usually
much quicker to consult printed government documents, reference materials,
computerised data, and research institute reports than it is to accumulate data
ourselves (Johnson & Joslyn, 1995:253).
The study will then cover the period between 1999 and 2003. The selection of this
period is important for one specific reason. The NeOp officially came into being mid-
term of the first parliament (February 4th, 1997). Which make it awkward for the
study to conduct any coherent analysis from 1994 to 1999, since the NeOp was
established after the adoption of the second constitution in 1996. After the adoption
of the new constitution in 1996, the old Senate was officially dissolved giving way to
the official luanch of the NeOp in 1997. Thus, the period between 1999 to 2003
covers a complete parliamentary term which render the NeOp more established than
the one in the previous parliamentary term.
1.3.2 Data analysis.
While the Bill process constitutes the study's unit of analysis, the major and
significant part of the study's analysis will focus mainly on section 76 Bills of the
constitution. These are Bills that directly affect provinces. The Constitution identifies
two kinds of ordinary Bills affecting provinces, namely section 76(1) and section
76(2). The distinction between the two relates to the procedure for the passing of such
4
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legislation rather than the impact such legislation has on provinces. In principle
section 76 (1) can only be introduced in the National Assembly, while section 76(2)
can be introduced in the NCOP. However, ministers are not bound by the above
principles as a result the choice for the House of introduction is discretionary. Mostly
depending on how quick the Minister wants the Bill to be processed.
Data analysis will then be structured around the Bill process. Focusing on Bills
introduced in the NCOP from 1999 to 2003. Selecting one Bi II from each year. This
will provide balanced analysis in terms of the varieties of the Bills and the different
circumstances under which they were processed. In an orderly format the study will
follow the Bill as it is tabled in the NCOP committees for deliberations. Purpose for
this approach is to monitor how the Bill changes (e.g amendments and/or rejections)
to a point where provinces confer their mandates.
1.3.3 Limitations of the study.
As Bromily, correctily stated that there are certain limitations that are beyond the
researchers capacity, and though seen by some as frivolous, may actually have a
tremendous effect on how the study unfolds, take shape, and ultimately becomes a
success story (Sipho Nsingo, 1996: 15). Accordingly, the study's limitations will
concern the following; there is a great possibility to rely on secondary sources of
information as indicated in the previous section. Secondly, since both parliament and
the NCOP run their own websites - a high degree of using these sites as sources of
information exists especially with regard to committee minutes and mandates. This
includes the site run by the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG). The latter has
done and continue to do extensive work on the legislative activities of parliament of
which Bills and committee deliberations are of major focus.
1.4 Key concepts.
1.4.J National Council Of Provinces.
The NCOP replaces the old Senate that was brought into being by the South African
Act of 1909. The difference between the old Senate and the NCOP is that the old
senate was often accused of duplicating the work of the National Assembly and of
"rubber stamping" Bills initiated by the first house. Conversely, the NCOP now has at
its disposal certain legislative powers guaranteed to it by the constitution. According
5
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to the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), the NCOP may "consider, pass, amend,
propose amendments to or reject any legislation before the Council". In terms of
composition it is composed of single delegation from each province consisting of ten
delegates. The ten delegates are; four special delegates consisting of the Premier of
the province or, if the Premier is not available, any member of the provincial
legislature designated by the Premier either generally or for any specific business and
six permanent delegates appointed within 30 days of an election of a provincial
legislature (Act 108, 1996).
The NCOP is the second chamber of parliament, the upper house of the National
Assembly. During the negotiations around the transformation of South Africa, the
idea of a more decentralised government was incorporated to accommodate parties
such as the IFP and the then National Party who had an interest in protecting their
federalist position against the centralist approach of the ANC. The product of these
negotiations was a political compromise that resulted in the creation of provinces
(Chakalson & Spitz, 2000: 135). According to Brandt (2001:9), one could conclude
that the NCOP was a result of a compromise based on the original proposal of the
ANC of a Council of Provinces. The NCOP therefore accommodated the more federal
nature of provinces supported by parties such as the IFP and the NP.
J.4.2 Bills affecting provinces.
Subsection 76 of the constitution empowers the NCOP to consider Bills that may have
an impact on provinces. Such Bills include legislation in areas such as agriculture,
education, housing, health services, etc. The process requires such Bills to be passed
by the NCOP. The supporting vote of five provinces is sufficient. However, if the
NCOP and the National Assembly do not agree on such a Bill, the Bill must be sent to
the Mediation Committee established to facilitate the resolution of disagreements
between the two chambers. If, in spite of attempted mediation, the two chambers
cannot come to an agreement the Bill lapses unless the Assembly passes the Bill with
a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members. In other words, even on Bills
affecting provinces the NA because of its two-thirds majority can override the NCOP.
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1.4.3 Provincial interests.
Subsection 42 (6) of the Constitution state that; "The National Council of Provinces
represent the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the
national sphere of government". There is in the constitution no specific example of
what constitute provincial interests nor in the documents that explain the role of the
NCOP. The whole exercise is made more cumbersome by the fact that provincial
interests may change from time to time depending on the Bill tabled before the house.
For example, a province might support the Gun Control Bill believing that such an
Act will reduce the use of unlicenced firearms and crime in general. Another province
might reject certain clauses of the Bill, that game-hunters, gun traders and individuals
who use guns for protection reasonss are inversely affected by these clauses and
propose amendments.
In that sense, delegates from their respective provinces with such mandates will be
regarded as conveying the interests of provinces. Accordingly, the study will treat
provincial interests to mean the mandates given to provincial delegates by their
respective legislatures. In other words, once a province confer a mandate to its
delegate for a particular Bill, such a mandate will be regarded as reflective of the
province's interests.
1.4.4 Promoting provincial interests.
The study distinguishes between representing provincial interests and promoting
them. For example the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1995: 1167) explain to represent as
to "stand for", "symbolise", "fill the place of', "be a substitute or speak for". Behind
these assertions lie huge complexities and ambiguities: in what sense, and under what
circumstances, does one entity "stand for" another, and on what grounds can one say
that representation is or is not taking place (Bogdanor, 1987: 529). Corollary,
representation is a matter that can only be established by evidence, and does not
necessarily follow as a matter of logic (Bogdanor, 1987:531).
1.4.5 Provincial legislature.
In the three spheres of government, namely national, provincial and local, we have
mainly two legislatures. These are the national legislature and provincial legislatures
and at local level we have municipal councils. Unlike in the national legislature there
7
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are no chambers (e.g NA and NCOP) in provincial legislatures except the ruling party
(alone or in coalition) and opposition parties. Provincial governments are formed by
parties that receive the highest votes during general elections where voters cast two
ballots; one national and the other for provincial legislatures.
The function of provincial legislatures as stated in section 104 of the Constitution is
to pass legislation for provinces on any matter related to schedule 4 of the
constitution. Such matters include areas in health, housing, language, police, casinos,
etc. In the NCOP these matters are classified as falling under section 76 of the
constitution and are treated as Bills affecting provinces. Another function of a
provincial legislature is to draft a constitution for that province. That is, if the
legislature deem it necessary to do so. According to subsection 104 (3) of the
Constitution such a regional constitution cannot override nor contradict the national
Constitution (RSA Act 108:1996).
1.4.6 Control over the legislative process.
Control over the legislative process refers to the bicameral nature of the national
legislature. The role played by each house in the legislative process and the powers
allocated each by the constitution. In the South African case for example Bills are
introduced in the National Assembly while only those affecting provinces are
introduced in the NCOP. The NCOP in that sense has control over the processing of
Bills affecting provinces, while the NA has control over all the other Bills. However,
the NCOP's control over Bills affecting provinces is blunted by the NA's two-thirds
majority. In other words, the NA can override the NCOP by a supporting vote of two-
thirds.
1.5 Chapter outline.
The study's enquiry is addressed in three chapters. Chapter one mainly outlines the
methodological framework of the study. It begins by giving an overview of the
problem to be researched and proceed by explaining the key concepts employed in the
study. It continues by giving an overview of the study's trajectory and the methods
employed in answering the research question.
8
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Chapter two constitute the literature review of the study. It begins by assessing the
existing literature on the NCOP and proceed by sketching the theoretical basis on
bicamerals worldwide. The focus is not on federal or unitary states but on second
chambers. The chapter look at countries with bicameral legislatures such as the
United States of America, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, etc. Again the aim here
is not to compare countries than to give examples. Furthermore, this chapter attempt
to reveal the reasons behind second houses; their roles and function inside parliament.
Furthermore, the chapter focuses on the composition, representation and legislative
powers of second houses. The main purpose being to illustrate how the South African
second chamber fit within the theoretical framework of bicameral legislatures
internationally.
Chapter three begins by articulating the legislative powers of the National Council of
Provinces and proceed by focusing on the body's legislative work in promoting
provincial interests. The chapter start off as descriptive and proceed with a critical
analysis of how mandates are conveyed and whether they carry within them the
interests of provinces. Furthermore, this chapter also covers issues such as committee
deliberations around proposed Bills and the mandates as issued by each province.
Chapter four lookk closely at the NCOP's role with respect to other aspects of the
Constitution namely, amendments and intergovernmental relations. The last and final
chapter illuminate on the main findings of the study before rounding off with some
concluding remarks and recommendations.
9
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CHAPTER TWO.
LITERATURE REVIEW.
2.1 Introduction.
Research on the NCOP is scant and the institution is fairly new and developmental in
character (Murray 1999; Mbeki's Conference Speech, 9 May 1998 and Brandt,
2001 :21). Most within and outside the NCOP regard the institution as "work in
progress" (PPP News, 1998:7). The then New National Party in its Parliamentary
Audit in 1997 alluded to the same concem: "The NCOP is a new, developing
institution and in the light of this the analysis of the activities of the NCOP is not
extensive as that of the National Assembly" (NNP Parliamentary Audit, 1997:39).
For any researcher on this subject this poses a number of challenges. Firstly, literature
on the NCOP is confined to government publications and commissioned reports.
Secondly, as a new institution the NCOP has "little or no profile" which makes it less
attractive as a subject of study. As a result any academic endeavour on the NCOP is
likely to be influenced by the scant literature and the gradual development of its
character.
The NCOP may be new and unique in the category of bicameral legislatures. As a
second chamber however it shares certain similarities with second chambers found in
other countries. That is why before anyone can understand the workings of the NCOP
or any second chamber, he or she must first understand the general characteristics of
second chambers in other countries (Brandt, 2001 :16). This brings familiarity with
trends around the world and how in particular the NCOP fit within that scheme of
second chambers. Yet, before we carryon with the task it is also important that we
first clarify South Africa's status as unitary or federal state.
South Africa does not qualify as a federal state. According to Mezey (1990: 14),
"federalism is a method of dividing powers so that the general and regional authorities
of a state each within a specific sphere can act in a co-ordinated way and yet
independently of one another. The smaller circles and communities are given the
greatest possible powers to undertake their own affairs and the attitude is that self-
govemment is better than being well govemed". Although the South African
govemance system is divided into three spheres, namely national, provincial and
10
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local. The powers allocated to provmces do not accord each provmce full
responsibility in running its own affairs.
For those reasons South Africa cannot be regarded as a federal state. lts governance
system is decentralised but not federalised. According to Joachim Wehner (1997:7),
"From a legal point of view, it bears all the essential features of a federal state, such
as stipulated provincial powers, a rigid constitution and an independent constitutional
court. Nevertheless, the de facto result compared to federal states can best be
described as a quasi-federal arrangement".
As a non federal state with a second chamber South Africa's national legislature faces
huge challenges both theoretically and practically. The fact that there's no prototype
in which the NCOP can measure itself against makes the challenge even more
cumbersome. Equally so, is the lack of understanding among NCOP members on
what role the institution is expected to play at national level. Whether to challenge the
first house on issues affecting provinces or simply allow the NA to impose its will
over provinces. To equip members and counter some of these challenges, parliament
has commissioned several studies to individuals and organisations to improve the
NCOP's role within parliament.
Such studies include a report by Professor Murray on the NCOP's oversight role. A
study regarded as a landmark in crystalysing the role of the NCOP (NCOP Review,
1994-1999). The study elaborated more on how the NCOP can use its constitutional
powers to hold the executive accountable. The point being to send the message to
cabinet and MPs in general that the NCOP was different from the old senate. That it
had certain powers that were guaranteed to it by the constitution. The study conducted
by the National Democratic Institute (NDl) was different in approach in that it
compared the role and structure of second houses in bicameral legislative systems in
selected countries (NCOP Review, 1994-19999). In its enquiry the study found that
the NCOP cannot be compared with any other second house in bicameral legislatures.
The closest being the German Bundesrat (NCOP News, 1998:5). Both these reports
remain useful points of reference on any study whose subject matter is the NCOP.
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Commissioned studies have been supplemented by ongoing initiatives in the form of
workshops. And it has been in these workshops where NCOP members really got to
understand what was expected of them. For example, in a two-day workshop held at
Medicina Centre, Parow the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki addressing delegates
lambasted: "The experience of the NCOP would seem to indicate that provinces are
failing to make use of the possibilities afforded them through the NCOP" (Conference
Speech, 8/9May 1998). He maintained that provinces should do more than they were
currently doing to ensure that their interests were taken into account at national level.
In this workshop deligates also deliberated on whether NCOP members should focus
on all Bills or only those considered to have a direct impact on provinces, namely
section 76 BIlls. This proposal was raised after concerns about provincial legislatures
having little or not enough time to deliberate on all Bills referred to them by the
NCOP. While delegates showed differing views on the matter it was however agreed
that the NCOP should consider all Bills brought before it by parliament yet pay due
regard to section 76 legislations as guided by the Constitution.
In academia, a growing interest In the NCOP is slowly gammg momentum. For
example, in her descriptive study of the composition and workings of the NCOP
titled; "From the Senate to the NCOP" under the subheading, "The future role of the
NCOP in the legislation process" Brandt remarks; "If provinces in the NCOP are
voting according to party lines and not according to provincial interests the purpose of
the NCOP is defeated" (2001 :21). Brandt is highlighting one of the most important
aspects on the NCOP's role. Indeed, the question whether provinces vote according to
party rather than provincial interests remain one of the determining factors of the
functionality of South Africa's decentralised governance system.
Concordantly, while the issue of provincial interests remains pivotal in the work of
the NCOP some studies have focused on individual provinces. For example, Cishe's
study (2001) laments the lack of effectiveness on the part of the Mpumalanga's
delegation. His study titled; "Improving the Effectiveness of the Mpumalanga
Representation in the NCOP" focuses on mandates conferred to delegates. Cishe
(2001: 18) identifies the clustering of Bills with one single mandate as unprofessional
and ineffective in promoting provincial interests. Consequently, he recommends that
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mandates should follow a certain procedure. That they have to be written on paper
bearing the letterhead of the Provincial Legislature. Signed either by the provincial
Speaker or the Secretary to the legislature. The content of the mandate should reflect
the conferring institution, the date of conferring, the date of plenary in the NCOP and
the issue to be voted upon.
The implication is that provinces do not deliberate thoroughly on Bills either due to
time constrains or lack of capacity. If indeed provinces don't pay proper attention or
fail to identify their specific provincial interests. It is unlikely that the NCOP will
effectively promote their interests. In some quarters the belief that the old senate,
(despite all the negatives it was known for) was better than the present NCOP still
persist. Comparing the NCOP to the old Senate, Godfrey Bhengu the IFP MP asserted
that his party had favoured retaining the old Senate since in his view it enjoyed "full
legislative competence with respect to all national legislation in areas of provincial
competence" (NCOP Review 1994-1999). Sharing the same view is Steven Friedman
(1999:2) in his article; " Power to the provinces". Friedman asserts that before the
1996 Constitution provinces had some leeway to make regional laws. Since then real
law-making now takes place in the NCOP or at least in theory.
He argues that, while provinces are supposed to debate national laws that affect them
(as indicated by section 76 of the Constitution), the complexity of the Bills and the
speed with which they must be processed often makes it impossible for legislature
members to give their NCOP delegates a considered mandate. In other words, time
constrains contribute to poor deliberations by provinces and in turn to unconsidered
mandates. Some provincial legislatures have complained about the programme of the
NCOP. Arguing that it is not synchronised with that of provinces. That when changes
are made provinces are not informed in time. According to Murray & Nijzink
(2002:52), "this is perhaps the most persistent concem of provincial politicians -
especially politicians from those provincial legislatures which have made progress in
establishing annual programmes". According to Murray & Nijzink (2002:48) some of
the concerns raised by provinces include the following;
.Cycles are too short for most pieces of legislation
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.Programmes are often changed or abandoned
.The abolition of a clear 'provincial week' in the programme limits the ability of
permanent delegates to liase properly with their provincial legislatures .
•Programmes are not properly co-ordinated with provincial programmes.
Concerns about the length of the programme persists although many permanent
delegates are under the impression that the problems are more imagined than real.
Permanent delegates also point to inefficiencies in provincial timetabling and suggest
that problems with the length of the programme are often the result of bad provincial
planning rather than the NCOP programme (NCOP Review, 1996-1999).
Nevertheless, the fact that two of the provinces, namely Gauteng and the Western
Cape with the most well-established timetabling and the best record of engagement
with the NCOP put the NCOP programme high on their list of concerns suggests that
the problem is more serious than national politicians admit (Murray & Nijzink,
2002:53).
A more optimistic view of the NCOP is reflected in Joachim Wehner's study (1998);
"What is the future of South Africa's provinces?". Wehner notes; "While the NCOP
has only been in existence for little more than one year, there are some indications
that the Council, despite technical hitches and a still weak institutional capacity will
facilitate co-operation between provinces with government from different political
parties" (1999:14). Elsewhere in his discussion paper Wehner points out, " ... the
NCOP is the only transparent and open body, formalised by the constitution in this
array of institutions. The configuration of interests whether common provincial
interests will develop over party interests -which will then determine the extent of
power the NCOP can exercise over law-making" (1994: 14).
In view of all the research done prior to this study, this paper look at the provisions of
the Constitution as pertains to the role of the NCOP. The Constitution makes it clear
that the NCOP should represent provincial interests not party political interests.
Section 42 (4) stipulates that, "the NCOP represents the provinces to ensure that
provincial interests are taken into account in the national sphere of government" (RSA
Act 108, 1996). Professor Gerhard Erasmus concurs by saying; "Provincial
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delegations represents their provincial legislatures, not a political party. That is why
each delegation generally has only one vote in the NCOP and why such a delegation
must obtain a mandate from its own provincial legislature" (1997:5).
The study seek to answer the question: Does the National Council of Provinces in its
deliberations work to represent the interests of provinces in the national legislature?
The question resonate concems raised by former Chairperson of the NCOP Naledi
Pandor when she said: "We will also have to ask ourselves whether, in our practical
reality we have trully sought to become an effective forum for the tabling of
provincial interests. We will also have to ask ourselves whether those interests, when
tabled are reflected in the legislation that emerge and in the manner in which our
committees conduct their work and in the decisions that we take" (NCOP News,
September: 1999).
The objectives are to bring clarity to the function and role of the NCOP as far as
provinces are concemed. To bring to light the process by which the NCOP promote or
fail to promote provincial interests in the national legislature and also; to make known
the obstacles that make the promotion of provincial interests cumbersome or less
successful. Finally, to bring under the spotlight the NCOP as an institution and
possibly stimulate further research on the institution.
2.2 Patterns of representation for second chambers:special interests.
Be it a bicameral or a unicameral legislature one thing for certain is that members of
the legislature represent some constituents. For example, where legislature members
are elected by popular vote, the constituents are the voters. In cases where members
are indirectly elected by their federal or provincial legislatures, their constituency are
indirectly the regional voters. According to Manin (1972:72) the purpose for
representation is to "refine and enlarge the public's views by passing them through
the medium of a chosen body of citizens" to give legitimacy on any decision taken by
the govemment. The form of representation often depends on how large or small a
country is in terms of population size. In some countries representation is the same
while in others population size of the state or regions determine how many
representatives are allowed for each province or region.
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For example in the United States of America the Senate is composed of two members
from each of the fifty one states (Polsby, 1990:76).The notion of equal representation
in the senate was to prevent legislative tyranny by the larger states over the small ones
(Rieselbach, 1990:71). According to Rieselbach (1990:72), the United States
pioneered equal representation in the second chamber when in 1787 in the Convention
in Philadelphia negotiators insisted on the same number of votes in the upper house as
the larger States threatened to disrupt the proceedings, until settled by allowing each
State two votes regardless of status or population.
In terms of strengthening checks and balances within assemblies and between
executives and assemblies, bicameralism has usually been seen as a central principal
of liberal constitutionalism (Heywood, 1997:244). This was the case in the debates
amongst the 'founding fathers' who drew up the US Constitution in 1787. Whereas
earlier second chambers, such as the British House of Lords, had developed as
vehicles through which powerful economic and social interests could be represented
in government, delegates such as James Madison saw the US Senate as a means of
fragmenting legislative and as a safeguard against executive domination (Heywood,
1997: 244).
In South Africa, the nine provinces, each is represented by ten delegates. According to
the Constitution (Act 108, 1996) the ten delegates are; four special delegates
consisting of the Premier, three other special delegates and also six permanent
delegates elected in accordance with the outcome of the general elections. Subsection
61 (3) of the constitution states that a legislation must ensure the participation of
minority parties in both the permanent and special delegates. The territorial or
population size has no bearing on the number of delegates. All provinces have an
equal number of delegations.
The Swiss system follows the same pattem: two representatives for each canton in the
upper house. In the Australian Senate provision is made for thirty six members, six
each from the six states despite population differences. Conversely, in the German
second house representation follow population size (Manin, 1997;34). There are sixty-
nine members in the second house. The Lander with more than 7 million inhabitants
have six seats (Baden- Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-
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Westphalia). The Lander with populations of between 2 million and 7 million have
four seats (Berlin, Bradenberg, Schleswig-Holstein, etc).The least populous Lander,
with fewer than 2 million inhabitants receive three seats each (Blair, 1993:61)
Second chambers are generally classified as either unicameral or bicameral. The
former refers to one chamber while the latter refers to two chambers. Unicameral
legislatures are associated with non-federal systems of governance. Where power is
centralized and concentrated at national level. Bicamerals on the other hand have
strong links with federal systems of governance. Lijphart in his study, Patterns of
Democracy (1999:213) points to the fact that there's a strong empirical relationship
between the bicameral-federal and unicameral-unitary dichotomies. In his view all
"formally federal systems have bicameral legislatures, whereas some non-federal
systems have bicameral and others unicameral parliaments" (1999:213).
According to Rieselbach (1990:4) fifty-five of the eighty-three countries surveyed by
the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1986 utilized a unicameral system. Of these
unicameral systems, the majority were unitary countries, with political power
typically concentrated in parliament at national level. Accordingly (Rieselbach,
1990:3), countries which are small in size are more likely to have one chamber rather
than two, as the problem of balance of political power is less difficult to solve than it
is in larger countries. Sometimes efficiency is cited as the primary reasons for a
unicameral legislature, particularly for countries that are ethnically and socially
homogenous. Equally so, unicameral advocates argue that one chamber structure
expedites the legislative process. Since second chambers tend to delay the legislative
process by amending or rejecting Bills referred to them by first houses.
Bicameral legislatures on the other hand are most frequently found in federal states
since they accommodate the dualist structure of the state; with a means of
representing both popular national interests as well as state and (or) regional interests.
Bicameral legislatures are suitable in countries with large population sizes and where
citizenship is composed of ethnically diverse groups (Blair, 1967:35). The primary
reasons cited for bicameral legislatures include adequate territorial representation,
stability, legislative-equality through extended deliberations, and protection against
the 'tyranny of the majority'. In general, second chambers are well known for slowing
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down the legislative process. Thus, if the goal is efficiency then, second chambers
make for inefficient legislative processing. Conversely, if the goal is improved quality
of legislation and increased representation, then the inclusion of a second chamber is
an appropriate institutional means to achieve such ends (Leroy, 1994:56).
Noteworthy in these categories are non-federal bicameral legislatures and an example
of a non-federal bicameral legislature can be found in South Africa. Though the
country is decentralized into three spheres of government and the second chamber
represent the different provinces. The Constitution state that: "All spheres of
govemment and all organs of state within each sphere must preserve the peace, the
national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic" (Act 108, 1996). Countries in the
same category as South Africa are Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Japan (See Table J
below). All are classified as semi-federal or simply decentralized systems.
Table 2.2.1
Degrees of federalism and decentralization.
Federal and decentralized countries
Australia Switzerland
Canada
German
United States of America
Federal and centralized countries
Venezuela
Austria and
India
Semi-federal countries
Israel Papua New Guinea
Netherlands Spain
Unitary and decentralized countries
Denmark Norway
Finland Sweden
Japan
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Unitary and centralized countries
Bahamas New Zealand
Botswana Portugal
Columbia United Kingdom
Source: Patterns of Democracy, Lijphart (1999: 189).
In their broad comparative study of bicamerals, George Tsebilis and Jeannette Morey
(Lijphart, 1999: 132) report that about one third of the countries in the world have
bicameral legislatures, and about two thirds have unicameral legislatures. In Lijphart
study of thirty six countries (1999) bicameralism is much more common than
unicameralism. For example in 1996 only thirteen of the thirty-six democracies,
slightly more than one third had unicameral parliaments, and exactly one-fourth had
unicameral legislatures, The thirteen countries with unicamerals, according to Lijphart
(1999: 144) tend to be the smaller ones in terms of size and/or population. With a
population of slightly more than ten million being the largest.
Conversely, countries with high population numbers tend to have bicameral
legislatures. The country is divided into regions provinces or states to decentralize
power for efficiency purposes. The upper house therefore becomes the one institution
to which these different states are represented in parliament (Manin, 1997:32). In the
United States of America bicameralism resulted from a compromise between the large
states and the small states at the Philadelphia convention in 1787 (Mezey, 1990:76).
At parliamentary level the second chamber is used to temper the democratic
aggressiveness of the first chamber or what is generally referred to as "the tyranny of
the majority" with a representative body of a more "conservative" chamber to restrain
the powers of the first chamber.
Legislative powers of second houses can be designed to reflect how the political
system of the country in question came into effect. On the other hand, in countries
characterized by deep divisions, majority rule could spell majority dictatorship and
civil strife rather than democracy (Lijphart, 1999:33). In such countries, often what is
needed is a consensus among contending parties. Democratic regimes that came about
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as a result of negotiations or consensus are examples of this. In the German
parliament for example the Basic Law (equivalent of the constitution) ensures that the
different majorities in the two chambers ensure that all legislation, when approved has
the support of a broad political spectrum - a particularly valuable attribute in the
aftermath of unification, when consensus on critical policy decision was most needed.
Thus, the German bicameral system was designed to accommodate the different states
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Legislative powers of the Bundesrat as reflected in
the Basic Law indicate these objectives. As a result, the formal representation of the
Lander in the federal government through the upper chamber provides an obvious
forum for the co-ordination of policy between the Lander and the federal government.
The need for such co-ordination, particularly given the specific, crucial needs of the
Eastern Lander, has become only more important (Rieselbach, 1990:64).
Similarly, the issue that shaped the South African model was the challenge of giving
effect to the unitary state while also incorperating the demand for some form of
provincial autonomy and differentiation. Other aspects of the South African model of
parliamentary democracy are transparency of legislatures and their structures and the
oversight of the executive at national and provincial level. This model provides strong
support to the constitutional imperative of co-operative governance. It also gives
provinces a measurable role in national matters (NCOP News, March1999).
This confirms Huntington's assertions (Jung & Shapiro, 1996:16) about the comming
into being of democratic regimes; " ... they were made through negotiations
compromise and agreements". The United States federal system or its upper house
also was as a result of laborious deliberations among the federalists and the unitarians.
According to Hamilton and Madison, "the presumably impetuous, popularly elected
House of Representatives would be checked and balanced by a more conservative
Senate ... "(Manin, 1997:38). The powers given the Senate are therefore a reflection of
the political compromise between the different states in the United States and the need
to address whatever challenges may confront the democratic process. Thus, legislative
powers of second chambers often reflect the historical background of each country's
political system. The compromise between different role players in establishing the
kind of political system that will in the future be able to resolve (democratically)
20
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
competing interests.
2.3 Legislative powers for second chambers.
The legislative powers of second houses often depends on two factors. First, whether
the executive authority is responsible to the legislature or each functions
independently. Secondly, whether members of the second houses are directly or
indirectly elected (Rieselbach, 1990:43). In cases where the executive and the
legislative authorities function independently, both houses have equal status in respect
of initiating and passing of Bills. Where the executive is answerable to the legislature,
the result is that greater legislative authority is shifted to the lower house. The lower
house dominates the upper house and according to Polsby (1990:74), the latter is
functionally degraded to a revisory and testing body
The South African case differs slightly in that the NCOP has relatively more powers
on Bills affecting provinces. Such a Bill can only become law after it has been
approved by the NCOP. If there is disagreement between the first and second house
about a Bill affecting provinces, the Bill is sent to the Mediation Committee which is
comprised of nine NCOP members and nine National Assembly members (NCOP
Rules, Document 1999: 12). If the the MC resolves the issue both houses must vote on
the Bill. If it does not, the Bill is returned to the National Assembly and a two-thirds
majority is required to pass the Bill (NCOP Rules, Document 1999: 12). In other
words, even on Bills affecting provinces the first house can override the second house
by a two-thirds majority.
However, where members of the upper house are not directly elected by the voters,
their legitimacy is not concretised and their political influence less so than that of
members of the first house. In other words, upper houses elected indirectly lack all the
elements which popular elections confers on any institution. According to Murray &
Nijzink (2002:57) there are good reasons for that: "The National assembly consists of
direct representatives of the political party you have supported in the election.
Delegates of the NCOP represent the legislature in each province and were elected to
the province and not to the NCOP. This means they represent their provinces and do
not reprresent the individual voters directly". This explains why legislative powers in
the national legislature are skewed in favour of the first house.
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In some legislatures, the legislative function is, in theory, shared equally between the
two chambers, both of which must pass a Bill before it becomes law (Rieselbach,
1990:8). In other bicameral parliaments differences exist between the legislative
powers of the popular (lower) and (upper) chambers (See figure 2 below). In Belgium,
Brazil, Italy, and Switzerland there are no restrictions on the right of each chamber to
introduce both financial and non-financial legislation. By contrast all Bills must be
introduced into the lower chambers of the parliaments of Australia, Austria, the
Netherlands and Spain (Lijphart, 1999:28). In the United Kingdom, govemment Bills
which are highly controversial originate by custom in the House of Commons, and
Bills which deal with legal and judicial matters often originate in the House of Lords.
The different rights of the chambers in bicameral parliaments can be seen most clearly
in connection with financial legislation. In some countries Bills involving finance
must originate in the lower chamber (Manin, 1997:58). This practice is based on the
belief that the authorization of expenditure and the imposition of taxation must be the
domain of the chamber elected by universal suffrage, and is founded on the principle
that the people must first give their consent to the financial burdens which they wi II
have to bear (Guissepe, 1994: 54).Whatever the relative strength of the two chambers,
agreements between them on a Bill puts the final seal on the legislative process.
Table 2.3.1
Country and chamberls legislative function Agreements on Bills
United States Laws must be passed by If differences exist a
(Senate and the House of both houses Committee Conference
Represenatati ves) must seek a compromise
and the report must be
approved by both Houses.
United Kingdom Laws must be passed by Amendments may pass to
(House of Lords and the both Houses and fro by both Houses
House of Commons until an agreement IS
reached.
Switzerland The State Council has The first chamber's
(States Council and the more powers on matters decision IS final and
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National Council) relating to Bills amending there's no formal
the Constitution. procedure to reach
agreement.
Source:Trevor L. Brown (www.wordlq.com/defillltlonlbundesrat Germany) 04/03/2004.
In terms of legislative powers the NCOP can only exercise those powers guaranteed
to it by the constitution. These provisions are enacted to empower the institution to
fulfill its mandate in representing provinces. However, a two-thirds majority from the
NA can override the NCOP. The section below elaborate more on the NCOP's
specific legislative powers in representing provinces.
2.3.1 Bills affecting provinces.
The Constitution (Act 108, 1996) distinguishes between two types of ordinary
legislation; section 75 legislation which refers to ordinary legislation not affecting
provinces and section 76 legislation which refers to ordinary legislation affecting
provinces. The distinction tracks the broader constitutional division of functions into
those that are purely of national competence (section 75) and those of concurrent
legislative competence (NCOP Rules document, 1999:7).
Section 76 legislation can be introduced either in the NCOP or the NA. Generally
speaking section 76 legislation is any legislation conceming a matter listed in
schedule 4 of the Constitution. Schedule 4 of the Constitution include Bills on areas
such as Welfare, Education, Health and Agriculture. These Bills are passed through
Parliament in accordance with the procedure outlined in section 76 of the
Constitution. They require provinces to formally arrive at a mandate. Each province is
allowed only one vote, and the legislation is passed if it has the support of at least five
provinces. Each vote is cast on behalf of the provincial legislature by the head of
delegation.
When such a Bill is introduced in the National Council of Provinces the chairperson
of the Council must send a copy of the Bill and the annexures to the Speaker of each
provincial legislature for purposes of enabling the legislature to confer authority on its
delegation to vote on the Bill; and table the Bill in the Councilor, if the Council is not
sitting, table the Bill on the day on which the Council resumes its sittings (NCOP
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Rules document,1999:8). This means that the provincial legislature must also consider
the Bill in its committees and hold public hearings where it is deemed necessary. The
fact that the NCOP must obtain mandates on some national legislation creates
significant opportunities for public participation.
2.3.2 Intergovernmental relations.
According to Penelope Andrews et al (2001 :204), if the South African Constitution
(Act 108 of 1996) was to be analysed against a formal federal checklist it could, with
justification be classified as federal. It has all the hallmarks of a federal system; nine
sub-national political entities called provinces, each possessing constitutionally
protected boundaries. And in each province the constitution requires a democratically
elected legislature and an executive accountable to it and to the inhabitants of that
province. Yet a closer examination would also reveal that the treatment of provincial
or regional powers in the constitution promotes or sanctions an integrated system of
governance in which national and sub-national government are deeply implicated in
each other's functioning.
In other words the three spheres of govemment operate under the auspices of what is
tenned intergovemmental relations. Subsection 40 (1) of Chapter three of the
Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) elaborate more by saying: "In the Republic
govemment is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government
which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated". Subsection 4.1 (a) and (g)
goes further by saying; " All spheres of government. .. must preserve the peace,
national unity and the indivisibility of the republic" (Act 108 of 1996). That they must
exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach
on the geographical functional or institutional integrity of government in another
sphere and must co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by;
(i) Fostering friendly relations.
(ii) Assisting and supporting one another.
(iii) Informing one another of, and consulting one another on matters of
common interests;
(iv) co-ordinating their actions and legislations with one another;
(v) adhering to agreed procedures; and
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(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another.
Thus, the principles of intergovernmental relations requires that the different spheres
of govemment, be they national, provincial or local co-operate with each other
"within each of these spheres as well as across spheres" (Devenish, 1998: 105). In
other words, intergovernmental relations is a process of harmonising the different
spheres of administration in such a way that the lower spheres have the capacity to
influence policy that they will have to execute. At inter-provincial level it implies co-
operation to ensure that legislative processes are harmonised in order to guarantee the
efficacy of the operation of the National Council of Provinces.
2.3.3 Public Access.
Public hearings are important for one specific reason for provinces and maybe for the
NCOP as well. During public hearings individuals and organisations can make their
submissions to provincial committees. Submissions by the public often identify areas
in which the Bill will affect a particular segment of society or society in general. Such
submissions often bring to the attention of legislators flaws that might have been
overlooked during the drafting of the Bill. In all, submissions by organisations or
individuals inherently translate the interests of voters in the province. Such
submissions may even help provincial legislatures in reaching a well considered
mandate. In other words, when a provincial legislature confers a mandate to its
delegates it is aware of what the people in the province want or expect from NCOP
delegates.
To enforce this practice subsection 72 (1) (a) of the Constitution states that: "The
NCOP must (a) facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of
the Council and its committees; and (b) conduct its business in an open manner, and
hold its sittings, and those of its committees, in public, but reasonable measures may
be taken to regulate public access, including access of the media, to the Council and
its committees. Subsection 72 (2) point out that the National Council of Provinces
may not exclude the public, including the media, from a sitting of a committee unless
it is reasonable and justifiable to do so in an open and democratic society.
In reality, "peoples' participation both at national and provincial level IS weak"
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(Bhabha, 1996: 13). According to Bhabha, "".it is only the highly organised and the
rich that take advantage of this accessbility. The rest cannot afford presence in
parliament even though their input is most needed" (1996:14). The worst scenario
case is the NCOP's low profile, where members of the public whether rich or poor
by-pass the institution to present their cases to the National Assembly. This is a
concern former Chairperson of the NCOP, Mr Patrick Lekota raised when he said that
unless the public is involved at provincial level there will always be questions about
provincial mandates, whether they give effect to the interests of provinces or those of
political parties.
2.3.4 Money Bills.
There are generally four types of Bills that can be processed by the national
legislature. They are sometimes referred to as section 74, 75,76 and 77 Bills.
According to subsection 77 (1) of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), "a Bi Il is a
money Bill if it;
(a) appropriates money.
(b) imposes national taxes, levies, duties or surcharges.
(c) abolishes or reduces or grants exemptions from any national taxes, levies,
duties or surcharges; or
(d) authorises direct charges against the National Revenue Fund.
Subsection 77 (2) stipulates that money Bills may not deal with any other matter
except (a) a subordinate matter incidental to the appropriation of money; (b) the
imposition, abolition or reduction of national taxes, levies, duties or surcharges;( c) the
granting of exemption from national taxes, levies, duties or surcharges; or (d) all the
authorisation of direct charges against the National Revenue Fund.
2.3.5 Bills amending the Constitution.
These are Bills designed to change or amend the constitution. The Constitution can
thus be amended by a Bill passed by the National Assembly with a supporting vote of
at least 75 per cent of its members; and the National Council of Provinces with a
supporting vote of at least six provinces (Act 108 of 1996). The NCOP may also
confer its support of six provinces if the Bill amending the Constitution relates to a
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matter that affects the Council; secondly if it alters provincial boundaries, powers,
functions or institutions; or amends a provision that deals specifically with a
provincial matter.
If a Bill referred above or any part of it, concems only a specific province or
provinces, the National Council of Provinces may not pass the Bill or the relevant part
unless it has been approved by the legislature or legislatures of the provinces
concerned. Furthermore, a Bill amending the Constitution may not include provisions
other than constitutional amendments and matters connected with the amendments.
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CHAPTER THREE.
THE NCOP AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS.
3.1 Provincial legislatures and the NeOp.
Provincial legislatures did not exist before April 1994 and, until February 1997, had
no involvement with parliament on national legislation. This means that Members of
Provincial Legislatures (MPLs) and staff in provincial legislatures were not familiar
with processes at national level. To make matters worse, the new legislative process
introduced by the 1996 Constitution was complex and needed to be tested in practice,
and this meant more load on the work of provincial legislatures (Murray & Nijzink,
2002:63). Provinces had to transform themselves from legislatures that had dealt with
an average of six or seven Bills a year to institutions capable of processing 108 Bills
in 1997, 137 in 1998, and up to 40 Bills in the short two month parliamentary session
leading up to 1999 (NCOP Review, 1996-1999,30).
From a financial point of view, most provincial legislatures were battling with small
budgets and inadequate infrastructure. As they were struggling to come to grips with
the new situation problems of administration; communication and co-ordination
abounded. The biggest obstacle however was the mindset of politicians themselves.
Many MPLs had seen themselves as provincial politicians focused on provincial
legislation and oversight of the provincial executive. While these functions remained
fundamental however, the introduction of the NCOP, saw MPLs becoming national
legislatures (Murray & Nijzink, 2002:64) and in turn conferring more responsibilities
on the part of MPLs.
When the then Chairperson of the NCOP, Mr Mosiua Lekota was asked in March
1999 whether the situation has improved, he said that provinces were participating
more actively. Noting also that, provincial governments would begin to focus more
intensely on the NCOP when members of the public and various other stake-holders
put pressure on the members (NCOP News, 2001, March:3). On the other hand, the
former Minister of Local Government, Mr Valli Moosa told an NCOP strategizing
workshop that the NCOP ought to take a different position to that of the National
Assembly. "Don't be shy or squeamish," Moosa said. "What the NCOP has to do is to
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bring to the table the conditions on the ground in the province which have an impact
on legislation, which perhaps from a purely national level you could see in a slightly
different way" ( NCOP Review, 1994-1999:24 ).
The issue of what constitutes a provincial position as opposed to, or in relation to, a
party position, is still a controversial one in the NCOP. This was something that
Coetsee cautioned about in his final address to the senate in January 1997 (NCOP
Review, 1996-1999:33). Coetsee said that a careful balance will have to be struck
between the interests of the people in the provinces and party political interests,
otherwise democracy will not operate properly (NCOP Review 1996-1999:32).
Speaking six months later, Hernus Kriel former Premier of the Western Cape, picked
up the same theme, pointing out that co-operative governance did not mean there
would not be tension and differences to resolve. "Co-operative governance does not
mean that this Council should become a mutual admiration society. It does not mean
that we will never have or should never have any differences of opinion. Nor does it
mean that central government prescribes and provinces jump. Co-operative
government means that we talk to each other, that we listen to each other,
compromise, persuade - that we give and that we take" (NCOP Review, 1996-
1999:32).
3.2 Representation of political parties in provincial legislatures.
Political parties represented in a provincial legislature are entitled to a certain number
of delegates in that province's delegation to the National Council of Provinces.
According to section 61 (2) of the Constitution, once the results of provincial
elections are declared, the legislature must within 30 days, determine how many of
each party's delegates are to be permanent delegates and how many are to be special
delegates (Act 108, 1996). This is determined in accordance with a formula set out in
Part B of schedule 3 of the Constitution. Mathematically, the formula is as follow;
No of seats of party x 10.
No. of seats in legislature + 1
An example from the Western Cape legislature will illustrate this point. The results of
the June 1999 election was as follows: the ANC had 18 seats, the NNP had 17 seats,
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the DP had 5 seats, and the ACDP and UDM had both won one seat each
(Parliamentary Whip, September 2000). There were in all 42 seats. The delegation to
the NCOP was determined as follows:
ANC: 18 x 10/43 = 4.18 (4 delegates)
NNP: 17 x 10/43 = 3.95 (3 delegates)
DP: 5 x 10/43 = 1.16 (I delegate)
ACDP: 1 x 10/43 = 0.23 (0 delegates)
UDM: lx10/43 = 0.23 (0 delegates)
Thus, the ACDP and the UDM were not entitled to a seat in te1111Sof this initial
calculation, since they did not have a full number that could be translated into a
position for a delegate. However, they did compete as far as surplus were concerned.
The NNP had the highest surplus (0.95) and was therefore allocated an additional
delegate. The next highest surplus was a tie between the ACDP and the UDM (NCOP
Rules Document, 2000: 15). In such a situation, where the competing surpluses are
equal, the undistributed delegates go to the party that recorded the largest number of
votes in the previous election. This happened to be the ACDP and the final allocation
was:
ANC: 4 delegates
NNP: 4 delegates
DP: 1 delegate
ACDP: I delegate
Total: 10 delegates.
According to section 61 (2) of the Constitution, once the result of a provincial election
is declared, the legislature must within 30 days, determine how many of each party's
delegates are to be permanent delegates and how many are to be special delegates.
This process of determination takes place in terms of the Determination of Delegates
NCOP Act, NO.69 of 1998. The table below show the number of delegates each party
won in each of the nine provinces.
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Table 3.2.1
PROVINCIAL DELEGATION IN THE NCOP (FROM 1999 - 2003).
PROVINCE PARTIES PERMANENT SPECIAL DELEGATES
EASTERN CAPE ANC 4 3
UDM
DP 0
FREE STATE
ANC 4 4
UDM 0
DP 0
GAUTENG
ANC 4 3
UDM
DP 0
KWAZULUNATAL
IFP 2 2
ANC 2 2
DP 0
NNP 0
LIMPOPO
ANC 5 4
UDM 0
MPUMALANGA
ANC 5 4
DP 0
NORTHERN CAPE
ANC 4 3
NNP 2
NORTHWEST
ANC 4 4
DP 0
UCDP 0
WESTERN CAPE
NNP 2 2
ANC 2 2
DP 0
ACDP 0
Source: Murray & Nijzinsk, Building Representative Democracy (2002:47).
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The Act states that each party entitled to delegates in the provincial delegation must
have at least one permanent delegate. In the above Western Cape example, this means
that the DP and the ACDP automatically had one permanent delegate each. Unlike the
formula in the Constitution, any fractions (or surpluses) must be ignored. This would
mean that the ANC and the NNP were both entitled to 2 permanent delegates (NCOP
Rules Document, 2000:21).
3.3 The Bill process in the national legislature.
3.3.1 Classification of Bills.
Before a Minister tables a Bill in Parliament, the State Law Advisors provisionally
classify what process the Bill must follow. Once tabled in Parliament, the Bill must
pass through the Joint Tagging Mechanism Committee (JTMC). This committee,
which consist of the Presiding Officers of each house, is responsible for the final
classification of the Bill (NCOP Rules Document, 2000:32). This is referred as
'tagging' the Bill. The Presiding Officers receive advice from the Parliamentary Law
Advisors on how the Bill should be classified.
The JTMC committee serves the purposes of parliamentary proceedings as a decision
making structure. To make final rulings in accordance with the classification of Bills
introduced in the Assembly or the National Council of Provinces. It also distinguishes
whether a mixed section 75/76 Bill may be proceeded with, or is out of order; and to
ensure that amendments to Bills do not render the Bill constitutionally or procedurally
out of order in terms of joint rules (NCOP Rules Document, 2000:32). A Bill that is
out of order is a Bill that conflict with the provisions of the constitution or with
parliamentary procedure as outlined in the rules committee. For example a Bill is out
of order if it incorporates sections that affect provinces and yet is treated as an
ordinary Bill not affecting provinces.
The JTMC's classification of and findings on a Bill are final and binding on both
houses. Whenever the JTMC must rule on the classification of a Bill, the Bill, and a
legal opinion on its classification or on the relevant question, must be submitted to the
members of the JTMC (NCOP Rules document, 2000:36). If the JTMC classifies a
Bill as constitutionally or procedurally out of order, the Bill may not be proceeded
with. This however does not prevent a Bill from being corrected and reintroduced. If
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it was found to be defective because of its contents; or if it was found to be defective
on a procedural point.
3.3.2 The NCOP and law making.
In terms of section 42 (4) of the Constitution, the NCOP represents the provinces. It
does this by mainly participating in the national legislative process and by providing a
national forum for public consideration of issues affecting the provinces. In terms of
section 44 (1) (b), 68 and 74 of the Constitution, the NCOP has the power to;
" ...participate in amending the Constitution in accordance with section 74
pass legislation with regard to any matter within a functional area listed in
schedule 4 of the Constitution to be passed in accordance with section 76; and
consider any legislation passed by the National Assembly" (Act 108 of 1996).
In terms of section 68 (a) of the Constitution, in exercising its legislative power, the
Council may consider, pass, amend, propose amendments to or reject any legislation
before it. Legislation may also be considered by the Council in terms of section 74,75,
76 and 77. Section 74 (8) further provides that if a Bill referred to in subsection (3)
and (b), or any part of the Bill, concerns only a specific province or provinces, the
Council may not pass the Bill or the relevant part unless it has been approved by the
legislature or legislatures of the province or provinces concerned. This provision
empowers provinces to take decisions on any matter that directly effects them
individually. This provision has not yet been tested in that provinces have shown their
approval on such matters such as on boundary demarcations.
3.3.3 Processing of section 76 Bills.
Because delegates vote according to mandate recieved from their provincial
legislatures, the legislative process in the NCOP must allow for provinces to discuss
such matters and formulate positions. At the same time, provinces, through their
delegates, need an opportunity to discuss matters with each other. To allow proper
consultation and discussion within the provincial legislatures and among provinces,
the NCOP operates on a four-week cycle process, as detailed below (Murray &
Nijzink,2002:65).
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Week One: A section 76 Bill is introduced in the NCOP. The relevant select
committee arranges a meeting at which the Minister or department that initiated the
Bill briefs it on the Bill. Special delegates may attend briefing sessions, but select
committee minutes are made available as soon as possible after the meeting via the
parliamentary website. Once the briefing has taken place, the chairperson of the select
committee dealing with the Bill usually discusses the process that the committee
wishes to follow with the programming Whip. Dates for the receipt of negotiating and
final mandates are reflected in the programme once confirmation has been received
that the relevant Minister is available on the envisaged date.
Week Two: Relevant provincial committees meet in the provinces to discuss the Bill.
If necessary, permanent delegates go to their provinces to brief the relevant provincial
committees on the Bill. Provinces may also hold public hearings during this week. At
the end of the week each province prepares a negotiating mandate.
Week Three: At the beginning of the week the relevant select committee of the
NCOP meets to discuss the negotiating mandates that provinces would have e-mailed
or faxed. Towards the end of the week provincial committees are required to meet
again to prepare final mandates for voting purposes.
Week Four: In the fourth and final week of the cycle the select committee meets
again to consider the final mandates that it would have received and to prepare its
report on the Bill. A plenary of the National Council of Provinces would also have
been scheduled during this week. The tendency is to schedule section 76 Bills for
Thursday plenaries. The delegation head votes on the Bill on behalf of each province.
A section 76 Bill however does not have to be completed in a single four-week cycle.
Sometimes a Bill is dealt with over two cycles, especially if the Bill would have
substantial impact on the provinces or if public hearings in the provinces are required.
It is important, however, to identify the date on which the Bill will be considered in
plenary early in the cycle, so that the relevant committee would be able to structure its
programme in respect of the Bill.
The objectives of the four-week cycles are two-fold namely, to enable the NCOP to
fulfill its constitutional obligations in terms of its role in the national legislative
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process, and in particular with regard to section 76 legislations. Secondly, to enable
the NCOP to exercise its oversight and accountability role in terms of the
implementation of section 76 legislation.
3.3.4 Mandates.
At the fourth stage of the cycle provincial delegates are expected to present their final
mandates obtained from their provincial legislatures. Subsection 65 (2) of the
Constitution requires national legislation to determine a uniform procedure by which
legislatures can confer authority to vote on their delegates. That legislation has not yet
been passed (NCOP Review, 1996-1999, 35). In the meantime legislatures have
developed a number of different methods for determining mandates. Murray &
Nijizink ( 2001, 49) outlines four models used by provinces to reach mandates for
their delegates:
• The first model, applied by the Northem Province provides that only the
House can confer the voting mandate to their delegation to the NCOP.
• The second model in lise in provinces such as the Free State, Eastern Cape,
Mpumalanga, North West and Westem Cape takes account of the fact that the
House may not be sitting. In these circumstances, certain committees can
confer a mandate by a special majority.
• According to the third model, applied for example in KZN. Mandates are
adopted by a special 75% majority of the NCOP Committee. If this fails, the
House must confer the mandate.
• A fourth, more flexible model is also in use in Gauteng, according to which
Bills are classified by a proceedings committee. Those Bills regarded as
important must receive mandates from the House while ordinary Bills can
receive Committee mandates. Technical Bills never have to go to the House
and are simply included on the ATC and, if no objections are received, the
report is taken as adopted.
The fact that no legislation exist to uniformly guide provincial legislatures to reach
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their mandates smack of lack of seriousness on the part of the NCOP. This could be
one of the factors contributory to the issuing of unconsidered mandates. For example,
in the Eastern Cape, Free State, North West and Western Cape mandates are
conferred by committees when the house is not sitting. In acassions where members
of the committee are not in full attendance the mandate can be conferred by a special
majority. The question is; can such people adequately deliver mandates that take the
interests of the provinces into account? For provinces like Northern Province, KZN
and Guateng, their methods would seem to suggest that house sittings must
correspond with the programme of the NCOP. Otherwise mandates can be delayed
because the house nor the committee was not sitting. These are the problems that have
been identified in the previous sections as partly responsible for the provinces' poor
deliberations on section 76 legislations.
3.3.5 NCOP Select committees.
Most committees in the NCOP are 'policy committees'. They mirror government
departments. They are responsible for the oversight of a particular department as well
as for the consideration of legislation produced by and relating to that department. In
the National Assembly these specialized committees are called portfolio committees;
in the National Council of Provinces they are called Select Committees (see examples
below). Since the NCOP has fewer members than the National Assembly, policy areas
have been grouped together and one select committee in the NCOP correspond with
several portfolio committees in the National Assembly.
Examples ofNCOP Select Committees.
Security and Constitutional Affairs.
Local Government and Public administration.
Social Development.
Education and Recreation.
Land and Environmental Affairs.
Public Service.
Labour and Public Enterprise and;
Finance.
The role of committees has been significant in the law-making process. Because of
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their scrutiny of draft legislations many amendments are proposed and accepted in the
committees. Changing the content of the Bill under discussion. Though the practice
has not been uniform to include all committees, but in some cases the contribution
often lead to legislation being changed significantly between its introduction in
Parliament and its adoption (Murray & Nijzink, 2002:64). In other words, the role of
committees in the law making process cannot be understated.
It is clear that NCOP Select committees do most of the work in terms of considering
Bills affecting provinces. According to the former Minister of local Government, Mr
Valli Moosa, (NCOP Review, 1994-1999:37), "unlike committees ll1 a more
traditional legislature such as the National Assembly, NCOP select committees
function as negotiating mechanisms". It is here that the interests of provincial
governments are negotiated. It is also here that provinces fail or reach a common
provincial view point.
It is at the fourth stage of the cycle that provinces deliver their final mandates. That
takes place in committees. Based on these final mandates from the committees, the
NCOP then can cast its vote on its sitting on section 76 legislations. Tn other words
the final mandates presented at the fourth-week of the cycle at committee level is
transferred to the NCOP plenary for section 76 legislations. There has been no
reported case where final mandates from the committees were changed once they
reached the NCOP plenary.
Corollary, most legislatures in the NCOP do not always use the plenary effectively.
Their view is that plenaries merely repeat committee discussions, leading politicians
to provide bland statements of their party's position rather than to engage in issues
affecting their provinces. A desire to avoid political confrontation, which might
embarrass a member of the same party or the executive, seems sometimes to
exacerbate this tendency. The result is that plenaries are poorly attended by
politicians, the public and the press altogether (Murray & Nijzink, 2002:161).
3.4. Bills.
The following Bills fall under the category of section 76 Bills except for the Firearms
Control Bill which is an ordinary Bill not affecting provinces. According to the
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Constitution section 76 Bills have a direct impact on provinces. In other words,
provincial legislatures and NCOP delegates must deliberate and assess how these
Bills may promote their interests before delivering their mandates. The formula for
tabling Bills during its procession is: (B34-1999). This indicate the number of the Bill
(e.g 34th) and the year in which it is being deliberated (e.g 1999).
3.4.1 FIREARMS CONTROL BILL (B34-1999).
Introduced by the Minister of Safety and Security on 19May 1999 as section 75
Bill. As amended by the portfolio committee on Safety and Security (NA).
The Bill is intended to provide for the prevention of crime involving the illegal
possession and use of firearms. It is designed to prevent the proliferation of illegally
possessed firearms by providing for the removal of such firearms from society and by
. .
improving controls over the possession of legal firearms
(www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/bills/1999). It also provide for the control of the
supply, possession, transfer and use of legal firearms; to replace the Arms and
Ammunition Act of 1969 (Act No. 75, 1969) in order to establish a comprehensive
and effective system of firearm control and management.
3.4.2 Reasons for the Firearms Bill.
The most serious problems with firearms in South Africa are the increasing number of
both illegal and legal firearms and their direct and indirect contribution to the high
levels of violent crime. There are about half a million illegal firearms in the country
already and more keep flowing into this pool. The main sources of these illegal
firearms are; firearms that have been stolen from private owners; firearms that have
been lost from the South African Police Service, South African Defence Force and
other state departments.
3.4.3 Provincial Concerns.
Provinces raised concerns around safety and security in which the Bill will become
part of the crime prevention strategy. Such concerns included shortages regarding
personal, vehicles and other equipment amounting to 928 million rand. The need for
specific goals and targets around eradicating crime, the increasing incidents of
hijackings, car thefts, border corruption, illegal immigration, robberies and vigilante
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terrorism (www.pmg.org.zalarchive/comitteeIl999). The dissatisfaction of police
reservists, the unacceptable treatment of rape victims at police offices, and the
widespread involvement of the police in crime were also of major concern.
Members of the committee deliberated on the textual aspects of the Bill without any
specific references to provincial interests. When the Bill was debated it was party
political interests that dominated the discussions rather than those of provinces.
Advocate Swa11of the DP (as it was known then), complained that it was bad that the
concessions which had been previously made by the ANC were taken away that
morning. He was referring to the fact that the ANC moved for alternative
formulations for certain clauses. This was to the surprise of the committee as these
were not the formulations to which the committee had previously agreed. The
opposition parties displayed general disapproval for this tactic of the ANC. They
described it as a "watering down of the whole practice of
Parliament .. (www.pmg.org.za/archive/committeesI1999) As a result only the ANC
voted in favour of altemative formulation while the DA, NNP, FF, ACDP, IFP and
PAC voted against.
3.4.4 Final Mandates from provinces.
1. Kwa'Zulu-Natal Province: expressed their support of the Bill.
2. Gauteng Province: presented their final mandate which supported the Bill.
3. North West Province: presented their final mandate which supported the Bill.
4. Eastern Cape Province: The Chair informed members that the Eastern Cape
province had not submitted a final mandate, but had forwarded it to the Chairperson
expressing their support.
5. Limpopo Province: expressed its support for the Bill.
6. Northern Cape Province: presented the Northern Cape final mandate which
supported the Bill.
7. Western Cape Province: conveyed their final mandate which supported the Bill.
8. Mpumalanga Province: the province forwarded their final mandate of support of
the Bill.
9. Free State Province: Supported the Bill.
The Bill was passed and ready to be tabled in the NCOP's next sitting.
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3.5 ADULT EDUCATION AND TRAINING (B42-2000).
Introduced by the Minister of Education on 25 October 2000 (as section 76 bill).
As amended by the protfolio committee on Education (National Assembly).
To regulate adult basic education and training; to provide for the establishment,
governance and funding of public adult learning centres and the registration of private
adult learning centres for quality assurance and quality promotion in adult basic
education and training for transitional arrangements
(www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/bills/2000).
3.5.1 Reasons for the ABET Bill.
To restructure and transform programmes and centers to respond better to human
resource, economic and development needs of the Republic. To redress past
discrimination and ensure representativity and equal access. To ensure to adult basic
education and literacy, the creation of knowledge and development of skills in
keeping with international standards of academic and technical quality. To advance
strategic priorities determined by national policy objectives at all levels of governance
and management within the adult basic education and training sector.
3.5.2 Provincial concerns.
Kwazulu Natal went through its submission, requesting clarity on any previous ABET
legislation, trusts, fees which allows the Head of the Department to report directly to
the Minister and skip the MEC. As far as the Chairperson was concerned there has
been no previous ABET legislation. It is simply indicated in the Constitution as
subsection 29(1), which acknowledges the right to basic education, including adult
education. As for trusts, the Chairperson indicated that the Bill acknowledges tribal
authority and indigenous law in terms of immovable property and trusts
(www.pmg.org.za/archive/committees/2000). Therefore, a public centre on trust land
is seen to be on public land, although it is acknowledged that it is part of a trust.
The Northern Cape raised concerns about the management of the public centre and
the employment of educators. The Chairperson pointed out the Employment of
Educators Act. He explained that, if the principal of the day school manages the
public centre, he said overtime will have to be paid even though that would create
labour complications. He agreed that it was not a good practice for a principal to have
two posts. The Northem Province once again needed clarity on the number of co-
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opted members. The Chairperson said that provinces can prepare their own notices in
terms of this Act, it is left to the provinces to determine the numbers of co-opted
members (www.pmg.org.za/archive/committees/2000).This issue elaborated the
Chairperson is specific to provinces so it is hard to deal with it at the national level.
The Western Cape had no written submission at the time of the meeting.
Free State and Mpumalanga Province and the Eastern Cape supported the Bill without
any queries. Northern Province suggested that the number of co-opted members be
limited rather than be left to the discretion of management. That according to the
chairperson was the discretion of each province. North West Province had queries
about the definition of "failure to perform", of a governing body of a public centre.
According to the Chairperson "failure to perform" at clause 14 is consistent with the
usage in the South African Schools Act (www.pmg.org.za/committees/2000).The
responsibility is to keep a school running based on objective criteria.
3.5.3 Final mandates.
Each province presented its final mandate:
1.Kwazulu Natal: supported the Bill.
3. Northern Cape: supported the Bill.
4. Western Cape: declared its support for the Bill.
5. Free State: supports the Bill with no amendments.
6. Northern Province: supported the Bill after some clarification.
7. Eastern Cape: supports the Bill with no amendments.
8. North West Province: supported the Bill after amendments.
9. Mpumalanga: supports the Bill with no amendments.
3.6 DISASTER MANAGEMENT BILL (B58-200I).
Introduced by the Minister of Provincial and Local Government on the 17 of
August 2001 as section 76 Bill. As amended by the portfolio committee on
Provincial and Local Government (National Assembly).
To provide for an integrated and co-ordinated disaster management policy that
focuses on preventing or reducing the risk of disasters, mitigating the severity of
disasters, emergency preparedness, rapid and effective response to disasters and post-
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disaster recovery and the establishment of national, provincial and municipal disaster
management centres; and for matters incidental to that
(www.polity.org.zalhtml/govdocslbills/2000).
3.6.1 Reasons for the Disaster Management Bill.
The Bill is an outcome of a spate of floods and dangerous fires that affected a number
of provinces. The Bill is therefore designed to provide relief equitably for those
provinces that may not have the necessary and required resources for the relief of
those affected by such disasters (www.polity.org.zalhtml/govdocs/bills/2000).It
provides for the establishment of an inter-governmental committee on disaster
management to co-ordinate efforts on post-disaster recovery within the borders of
South Africa.
3.6.2 Provincial concerns.
Since the Bill provides a national framework for the financial assistance and
management of disasters, powers were however delegated to provinces in terms of
handling and funding such incidents. Provincial delegates accepted the Bill raising
few concerns. Ms Joyce Kgoali Member of the Gauteng legislature (ANC) raised
concern on the use of "may" instead of "must" in Clause 46(2)(a) of the Bill. Mr P
Maloyi, MPL of the North West (ANC) maintained that the Department had clarified
the reason behind the use of "may" instead of "must". Tt was said that provinces had
the discretion on which structures to establish within their municipalities and
therefore they cannot be directed by national parliament.
Kgoshi L. Mokoena of the Limpopo provincial legislature (ANC) commended
Gauteng for having done its homework with regard to this Bill. However he noted that
the committee must be viewed as a political forum, established to assist the MEC and
therefore not an administrative forum (www.pmg.org.za/archive/committees/20001).
He further held that some of the issues raised by Gauteng, since they cannot be
included in the Bill, they would be catered in the regulations framework. The
Chairperson concurred with the above argument. He further held that it should be
noted that the discussion on this issue has been dragged for far too long with the
intention of getting all parties to agree and can no longer be entertained. Gauteng
should accept Clause 46 (2) (a) as interpreted by the Department.
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The Eastern Cape Province raised concerned on the use of militaristic concepts in the
Bill such as "unit commands". The Eastern Cape Provincial Parliament requested that
something should be done as soon as the area has been declared a disaster area since
declaration without action can be useless. The Chairperson noted the concerns and
requested Mr L Buys: Head of the National Disaster Management Centre, to comment
on the issues raised. Mr Buys noted that the Committee has the power to order the
Social Development Committee to act immediately after an area has been declared a
disaster area (www.pmg.org.za/archive/committees/2001). The Committee
acknowledged the concern raised by the Eastern Cape Government regarding the use
of militaristic concept in the Bill, however it advised the province to modify these
militaristic concepts with regard to its community.
3.6.3 Final mandates.
The Chairperson requested Members to present final mandates from their respective
provinces.
I. Western Cape: Mr C Ackermann (Western Cape) (NNP) said the Western Cape
Provincial Parliament fully supports the Bill as it is.
2.Gauteng Province: Kgoali (ANC) noted that Gauteng fully support the Bill and
would also appreciate the fact that its concerns would be catered in the Regulation to
the Act.
3. Eastern Cape Province: Ms P Majodina (ANC) held that the Eastem Cape
Provincial Parliament accept and fully support the Bill without raising any
amendments to it.
4. North-West Province: Mr Maloyi (ANC) held that the North-West Provincial
Parliament fully supports the Bill.
5. Limpopo Province: Kgoshi Mokoena (ANC) held that Limpopo Provincial
Parliament fully backs the Bill as it is.
6. Mpumalanga Province: Mpumalanga fully supported the Bill, without any
reservations.
7. Northern Cape Province: the Northern Cape Provincial Parliament, whose
representative was absent from the meeting, according to the Chairperson support the
Bill.
8. Kwazulu-Natal Province: Prince B Zulu (ANC) explained that his provincial
Parliament also fully supported the Bill as it is.
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9. Free State Province: The Chairperson noted that since the Committee had not
received any formal document from the Free State government, it would be taken that
no final mandate had been received from that Province. He then read the Committee's
report on the Bill. The Committee unanimously accepted the report and the Bill.
3.6 DIVISION OF REVENUE BILL (B5-2002).
Introduced by the Minister of Finance Oil 23 February 2002 as section 76 Bill.
Referred to committees (select committe on Finance) from the National Assembly.
To provide for the equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the national,
provincial and local spheres of government for the 2002/2003 financial year; to
provide for reporting requirements for allocations pursuant to such division. To also
provide for the withholding and the delaying of payments for the liability of cost
incurred in litigation and in violation of the principles of co-operative governance and
intergovernmental relations (www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/bills/2002).
3.6.1 Reasons for the Revenue Bill.
The revenue Bill is intended to counter some of the problems experienced by
provincial and local governments in terms of financial management often resulting to
huge debts and/or financial crisis. The Bill is therefore designed to provide for the
equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the three spheres of government
(www.polity.org.za/html/godocs/bills/2002). To promote co-operative governance in
the budget allocation and transfer process and promote better co-ordination between
policy, planning, budget preparation and execution processes as well as predictability
and certainty in respect of all allocations to provincial and local governments to
ensure that such government my plan their budgets over a multi-year.
3.6.2 Provincial concerns.
The delays associated with the transfer of funds from provinces to municipalities
dominated the discussion. It was generally agreed that one major problem was that
grants went via the provinces instead of directly to Municipalities. Provinces in turn
blamed National Government, saying that the delays emanated there
(www.pmg.org.zalmunites/2002). The Finance Department however cautioned
against removing the discretion the Director Generals had in permitting direct
transfers to municipalities given the shaky financial development of some
municipalities.
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Kwazulu Natal and Western Cape Province raised the same concerns. The former
stated that grants are given by National Departments to the provinces towards the end
of the financial year. This is problematic as provinces cannot effectively expend these
funds within the limited space of time and without having planned for such
expenditure (\vww.pmg.org.za/minutes/2002). It would be advisable if local
municipalities were to be informed of the conditional grants early in the financial year
in order to be able to plan for such funds before they are actually transferred to
provinces.
The Kwazulu-Natal delegate also raised the issue of recurrent expenses. When
National Govemment decide to allocate funds for the building of a school. It has an
obligation to make provision for the recurrent expenses of such a school. To simply
allocate funds to build the school without planning for its sustenance was
unacceptable. Ms J Fubbs, ANC Gauteng legislature, commented that Gauteng had
also raised a similar problem regarding timeous payments pertaining to the sustanance
of government funded projects.
3.6.3 Final Mandates
1. KwaZulu-Natal Province: Mr Bekker presented the Kwazulu-Natal final mandate
stated that it supported the Bill.
2. Gauteng Province: Dr E. Conroy (NNP) [Gauteng] presented their final mandate
which supported the Bi II.
3. North West Province: Mr Z. Kolweni (ANC) presented their final mandate which
supported the Bill.
4. Eastern Cape Province: The Chair informed members that the Eastem Cape
province had not submitted a final mandate, but had forwarded it to the Chairperson
expressing their support.
5. Limpopo Province: Mr M. Makoela presented the Limpopo final mandate which
supported the Bill.
6. Northern Cape Province: Mr G. Lucas presented the Northern Cape final mandate
which supported the Bill.
7. Western Cape Province: Mr K. DUIT (ACDP) presented the final mandate of
support for the Bill.
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8. Mpumalanga Province: The Chair stated that no delegate from the Mpumalanga
province was present today, but the province had forwarded their final mandate of
support to the Committee.
9. Free State Province: Mr Ralane presented the Free State final mandate which
supported the Bill.
3.7 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE BILL (B57-2003).
Introduced by the Minister of Social Services and Development on 3 September
2003 as section 76 Bill. As amended by the protfolio committee on Social Services
and DevelopmenttNationul Assembly).
To provide for the rendering of social assistance to persons; to provide for the
mechanism for the rendering of such assistance
(www.polity.org.zalhtml/govdocs/bills/2003). Also to provide for the establishment of
an inspectorate for social assistance and for matter connected with rendering such
services.
3.7.1 Reasons for the Social Assistance Bill.
To assist in securing the well-being of the people of the Republic and to provide
effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government in respect of social
assistance. Since the provision of social assistance requires uniform norms and
standards and delivery mechanisms for the efficient, economic and effective use of
the limited resources available for social assistance and the promotion of equal access
to government services. The Social Assistance Bi IIwas therefore deemed necessary.
3.7.2 Provincial concerns.
The commitee meeting was attended by representatives from the Department of
Social Services with advocate W. Krull as the spokesperson. He pointed out that the
main concern was the gap between national and provincial legislation. If the transition
was not properly managed, there would not be any legal provision for social
assistance. A related issue was that of managing the rights of citizens to access as well
as the administration and operation of social assistance. "Beneficiaries", asserted
advocate Krull, "should not even be aware of the change in legal administration and
there should not be any interruption at the front end of operations."
(htpp://www.pmg.org.zalarchiveI2003).
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Advocate Krull stated that MPs could not prescribe to provincial legislatures. The
Constitution could provide legislation for national administration and also provide the
President with powers of assignment, but not for provincial counterparts. Ideally,
there should be a mechanism in the Constitution to allow the President to assign
powers from provincial to national level. There's a clause in the Bill that provide for
the powers of the Director-General to be delegated to provinces. It was vital that co-
operation and support from key role-players be secured, particularly from the various
provinces so that the transition from provincial to national level is facilitated. Such
issues where provincial legislatures acted independently had already been raised at
MinMEC (www.pmg.org.za/minutes/2003). A great deal depended on the co-
operation of the MEC's and their respective legislatures.
Ms G Borman (DA) asked whether centralisation would work if all provinces bought
into the concept or whether Constitutional and legislative problems could still arise.
Advocate Krull responded by saying; "the extent to which the Social Assistance Act
had been assigned. The assigning provision in the Interim Constitution, Section 235
(8), stated that the President could assign functions from the national to the provincial
sphere. The provisions stated that where certain criteria were met by the national
legislation, this prevailed over any provincial law" (www.pmg.org.za/minutes/2003).
This included situations where national law was required to set uniform norms and
standards to maintain economic security, internal unity and so forth. If there was a
provincial law providing for grants and a national law providing for the same, the
national law would prevail
The Chairperson read the motion of desirability for the adoption of the Bill. All the
other parties agreed with the exception of the DA as it abstained. It would seem that
the committee was anxious to pass this Bill as quickly as possible. Beside while the
Bill was still under discussion the Second Parliament was nearing its end of tenno
Elections where to be held on the 14th of April the same year. Avoiding to be behind
schedule provinces delivered their provincial mandates.
3.7.3 Final mandates from provinces.
All the provinces submitted their final mandates, with the exception of Gauteng and
North-West, whose final mandates would be submitted in the Plenary of the NCOP.
The following provinces supported the Social Assistance Bill.
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1. Eastern Cape Province: Ms N. Kondlo (ANC) said that they supported the Bill.
2. Free State Province: Ms N. KhllDOU (ANC) said that her Provincial Legislature
supported the Bill.
3. Gauteng Province: The Chair noted that since the Gauteng Provincial Legislature
would only convene on the 24 February to consider the Bill, they would submit their
final mandate during the Plenary.
4.KwaZulu-Natal Province: The Chair saw that there was no-one representing the
KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature in the meeting to read their Final Mandate.
However, it had been expressed that the province supported the Bill.
5. Limpopo Province: Ms R. Mashangoane (ANC) said her Provincial Legislature
supported the Bill.
6. Mpumalanga Province: Ms M. Themba (ANC) noted that her Provincial
Legislature supported the Bill.
7. Northern Cape Province: The Chair, noting that there is no one representing the
Northern Cape Provincial Legislature in the meeting, and thus read out their final
mandate which was sent. They supported the Bill.
8. North West Province: The Chair noted that the Committee had not yet received a
final mandate from the North West Provincial Legislature.
9. Western Cape Province: Mr F. Adams (NNP) noted that his Provincial Legislature
fully supported the Bill.
The Chair concluded that seven out of nine provinces supported the Bill.
While the chapter focuses on the Bill process there are however three important
factors that need to be taken into account. The first is the outcome of provincial
elections. Secondly, each seat received determines the balance of power in the NCOP
and how that power is exercised. Thirdly, to understand the work of the NCOP will
necessarily require understanding the composition of each provincial legislature.
Reasons for this stem from the fact that election result are responsible for the political
power each party gains and exercises both at provincial and national level. This will
also give clarity on how provincial mandates are reached by members of provincial
legislatures.
Provinces such as the Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal provide good examples of
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the balance of political power both at provincial level and in the NCOP. The two
provinces were once under the rule of two opposition parties, namely the then New
National Party and The Inkatha Freedom Party. While the ANC taak control of the
remaining seven provinces. After the 1999 election the then NNP in coalition with the
Democratic Alliance fomled the Westem Cape government to curb the growing
dominance of the ANC, while the IFP's dwindling support in the province saw the
ANC taking control of the province after the Minority Front's only seat in the
province was swayed to the ANC.
The NNP and DA coalition however was short-lived, and in 2000 the break-up
became unavoidable forcing the then NNP to join forces with the ANC to form once
more a new government in the West em Cape. These changes arguably had an effect
on how the NCOP in its composition responded to section 76 Bills tabled before it. It
may had an effect also on how the mandates were reached by provinces as indicated
in the previous paragraph. That is, which political parties voted in favour and which
voted against and whether the ruling party in the province used its majority vote.
4. Evaluation.
Before we answer the question whether mandates delivered in the NCOP select
committees carry the interests of provinces, first lets look at how provinces cope with
the NCOP legislative process. That will give us a background as to what effort
provincial legislatures put in their deliberation to reach a mandate that truly carry the
interests of provinces. According to Murray & Nijzinski, (2002: 75), formulating a
mandate is substantial and a very demanding task. It means that small provincial
legislatures have to grapple with major Bills over which the 400-strong National
assembly deliberates for months.
For example, in 1999, 19 of the 60 Bills passed by national parliament fell under
section 76 of the Constitution. In 2000, 20 of the 70 Bills passed fell under section 76.
This inevitably meant that in a well-functioning provincial legislature, a review of
national legislation would have occupied a considerable amount of time (Murray &
Nijznk, 2002: 76). Add to this the lack of capacity, the irregular programming of
sittings as well as the skewed understanding of what the NCOP role is in parliament
among its own members.
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Raising the same concems is James Selfe, the then DA MPL in Gauteng who
complains about poor programming, incorrect tagging of Bills, fast tracking of
legislation and members of the executive who change their programmes at short
notice, making it difficult for the NCOP delegates to properly consider section 76
Bills. James echoes the same sentiments expressed by delegates from the Northem
Cape Province. Both Gauteng and the latter have been complaining about receiving
updated information timeously from the NCOP structures in Cape Town. Bills often
arrive late, sometimes a day before the sitting of the NCOP. As a result, committees
do not have enough time to make informed comments on them.
This explains why some provinces like the Eastem Cape, Free State and Northem
Cape have difficulties in delivering their mandates in time. Tt would seem that unless
NCOP programmers take the matter of programming seriously functioning of the
institution will be held hostage by administrative hitches. The fact that its always
members from opposition parties who complain about the NCOP programme shows
that members of the ruling party are reticent in embarrasing their colleagues about
poor programming. This loyalty obviously has inadvertent consequences on the
smooth functioning of provincial legislatures. Particularly in deliberating on section
76 legislations.
Beside administrative hindrances, most NCOP delegates especially from the side of
the opposition have conveyed duanting views about the NCOP's role in promoting
provincial interests. According to the former KZN Premier, Lionel Mtshali, " I do not
believe that provinces have used the opportunity that the NCOP creates in enabling
them to bring their concems before the national parliament" (NCOP News,
September, 1999:4). James Selfe argues that provinces need to develop self
confidence to buck the majority party line whenever this is necessary. "We all know
of provinces that were unhappy with legislation but which were persuaded to go along
in order to get along"(NCOP News, August, 1998: 7).
Although there is growing understanding of the purpose, role and functioning of the
NCOP, in some quarters there is still lack of understanding of the NCOP
conceptually. According to W. F Mnisi DA MPL in Gauteng, " some members of the
ruling party seem to be unclear as to the role of the NCOP. Yet, the main difference
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between the NCOP and the old Senate is that the NCOP is not a rubber stamp
mechanism - at times members of the ruling party seem to be easily persuaded by the
proceedings and decisions arrived at in the NA"(NCOP News, March 1999:4). The
Procedural Manager, Desiree Le Roux, speaking at the ss" general meeting of the
Society of Clerks-at the tables in Wellington New Zealand commented; " Some
provinces see the NCOP as an institution in which they, acting in concert, can stare
down central government", forgetting that they have constituences to represent
(NCOP News, November, 1998:9).
Looking at the discussions and deliberations in the committees, the implication is that
committees are the melting points. Here views are expressed and political differences
are allowed to emerge as members deliberate on Bills. Amendments are sometimes
made at the suggestion from opposition parties. The impression is that committees are
not only melting points but also where party members and provincial delegates let off
their steam and satisfy themselves that they've done their job.
For example the KZN delegate raised coneernes regarding the province's interest
where he asked about tribal authority and public centre on trust land in the Adult
Basic Education and Training Bill (B42-2000). The Chairperson addressed some of
the concerns raised by the KZN delegate. However, when the time to deliver their
mandate came, the province supported the Bill. Criticising the Bill during
deliberations and discussions and delivering a provincial mandate seem to be two
different things among NCOP delegates.
The same attitude is noticeable in the Division of Revenue Bill (B5-2002). Provinces
raised concems about grants given to provinces instead of directly to local
municipalities causing delays on expenditure. Kwazulu-Natal even hinted that when
national government fund the building of a school, it is her obligation to provide for
recurrent expenses. While these concerns seem genuine they didn't stop provinces in
delivering their mandates in support of the Bill.
Another pattern that is noticeable is the voting pattem of provinces. For exampls from
1999 to 2003 all the selected Bills show that provinces under the ANC rule delivered
their mandates in favour of the Bills (except for those who delayed their mandates).
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Since 2000, and in all the nine provinces the ANC constituted the majority. As for
opposition Mr C. Ackerman made it clear where the then NNP stood. He said, "It
would be a mistake to continually see us as an opposition province which seeks to
oppose national government at every opportunity ... we want to playa constructive
role to prioritise the interests of the people" (Hansard, NCOP debates, 2000: 6-8
June).
However, Dr Lucas Nel's views differed with his colleague's views in the Western
Cape. Dr Lucas, the then Leader of the NNP opposition in the Mpumalanga
legislature maintains: "There is a possibility that the NCOP can become a rubber-
stamp for the National Assembly" ( NCOP News, August, 2000:4). Lucas argues that
the ruling party in the province becomes a slave to decisions made by the ANC
nationally.
Dr Lucas cited the example of the Educational Laws Amendment Bill, "which was
discussed at provincial level and adopted as introduced. The NCOP delegation was
subsequently mandated to vote for this Bill; but when delegates went to Cape Town,
they voted for a Bill amended by the NA portfolio committee on Education (in
principle a different Bill). In the final analysis, the delegation failed to fulfill its
mandate, following instead the lead of its political party (NCOP News, August,
2000:6). Mr Boy Johannes, ANC MPL in Mpumalanga disagrees; " We are
committed to the NCOP as a structure that represent the views of the province rather
than the political party. There are many examples (though none is provided) where
ANC-dominated provinces made amendments to legislation that in principle went
against what was decided in the NA or by the ANC ... " (NCOP News, August,
2000:6).
The former Chairperson of the NCOP Mr Mosiua Lekota put it rather differently
when he said, "if you were to look at provinces like the Northern Cape, Western
Cape, Eastern Cape and KZN, and you increase fishing quotas all these provinces
would probably vote in favour of such a system. It does not matter that they are ruled
by three different political parties. Increasing quotas means increased jobs and food
supplies for the people in their provinces. These are still political issues you're
dealing with, but the responsibility of a provincial delegation is to look at the interests
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of the people in those provinces" (NCOP News, March, 1999:4). Mr Lekota's
example may be much more relevant prior to 1999 where at least two of the
provincial legislatures were under the NNP and IFP rule.
From 2000 to the end of the second term of parliament all nine provinces where under
ANC's control. This then makes it difficult to determine whether any mandate in
favour of fishing quotas would be intended to benefit the province or its people rather
than the party in power. A party as dominant as the ANC could gradually become
accountable to itself in the absence of strong and effective opposition. This will then
mean that whatever the NCOP say or does as far as provincial interests are concerned
will be treated as such up until strong opposition hold it accountable or the people
from provinces do so.
Lekota however, makes a good point in saying; "" .but none of this will succeed
unless we raise the level of public understanding and make people aware of the role
they must play in Parliament" (NCOP News, March 1999:4). Indeed, as long as the
people are not made aware of their in the decision making process at provincial level,
delegates will continue to be accountable to their party structues rather than people in
the province. In the meantime what they do or choose to do in the NCOP is only
questioned by opposition parties. Even so where the power of the opposition is weak
and ineffective, NCOP delegates can easily ignore opposition and always claim to
represent the electorate. Thus, unless the public is made aware of the role of both
provincial legislatures and the NCOP, and effectively participate in these structures
the distinction between provincial interests and party political objectives will remain a
grey area.
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CHAPTER FOUR.
THE NCOP AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
4.1 Amending the Constitution: the evidence.
The NCOP's role in representing provinces can also be evaluated in terrns of how the
body respond to Bills amending the Constitution. Bearing in mind that the procedure
followed in amending the constitution differs from other Bills passed by the two
houses. A two-thirds majority vote from the NA and a vote of six provinces from the
NCOP are the basic requirements for passing a Bill amending the Constitution. In the
period between 1999 and 2003 there have been few amendments to the constitution
except for the 'floor-crossing' Bill. The Bill was introduced by the Minister of Justice
and Constitutional Development, Mr Penuell Maduna through an ordinary Act of
Parliament. Allowing MPs, MPLs and local councillors to join other political parties
without loosing their seats.
The Amendment Bill went as follows; "To amend the Constitution of South Africa,
1996, in order to enable a member of the National Assembly or a provincial
legislature to become a member of another party whilst retaining membership of the
National Assembly or that provincial legislature. Also to enable an existing party to
merge with another patty, or to subdivide into more than one party, or to subdivide
and anyone of the subdivisions to merge with another party, whilst allowing a
member of a legislature affected by such changes to retain membership of that
legislature" (www.polity.org.zalhtml/govdocs/document).
This legislation was divided into four separate Bills, all addressing the floor crossing
issue. The first Amendment Act and the Local Government Amendment Act both
related to floor-crossing at local level (Devenish, 2001: 146). The first Amendment
Act provided for a 15 day period during the second and fourth year after a general
election, as well as a one-off fifteen day period immediately following the
commencement of the legislation, during which party allegiance could be changed
without councillors losing their seats. The Local Government Amendment Act
complemented the first Amendment Act by removing references to the bar on floor-
crossing and making provisions for various aspects of local government to
accommodate the new system of limited floor crossing.
54
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The second Amendment Act and the Loss or Retention of Membership of National
and Provincial Legislatures Act related to floor-crossing in national and provincial
legislatures. The latter permitted a limited system of floor-crossing during a fifteen-
day period during the second and fourth years after a general election as well as a
once-off fifteen-day period immediately following the commencement of the
legislation. The Second Amendment Act complemented the Membership Act by
allowing the alteration of the composition of provincial delegations to the NCOP if
the composition of a provincial legislature was changed due to floor crossing.
The controversial Bill was subsequently challenged by the United Democratic
Movement in the Cape High Court. First a single Judge and then a full bench of the
Court dealt with the matter. The full bench suspended the commencement and/or
operation of the four acts pending the decision of the Constitutional Court on the
application of the UDM to declare the acts invalid and unconstitutional. Responding
to questions by NCOP members about floor-crossing, Deputy President Jacob Zuma
said: "I must remind members that the amendments to our Constitution were
supported by all nine provinces and all but three of the parties represented in the
NCOP, namely the UDM, the IFP and the FF plus. The few parties that opposed floor
crossing took the matter to the Constitutional Court and asked the court to rule that
the amendments were unconstitutional. .. " (Hansard, NCOP debates, September
2000: 256). As far as the NCOP was concemed the floor-crossing legislation was
done with as all provinces gave their support.
Judgement by the Constitutional Court on 4 October 2002 after complains by
opposition parties ruled that floor-crossing by members of Parliament and the
Provincial legislature could not be permitted through an ordinary Act of Parliament
and that this objective could only be achieved by amending the Constitution. The
Justice Minister, Mr Penuell Maduna went along and his team drafted a Bill
amending the constitute arguing that the amendment was necessary since those
members who have expressed their intention to cross in terms of the earlier legislation
passed by Parliament at the time were still determined to exercise their rights.
Opposition parties both at national and provincial level saw this as the ruling party's
attempt to weaken opposition. The UDM challenged the constitutionality of the
legislation. The party argued amongst others that the legislation compromised the
55
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
constitutional requirement that the electoral system should allow for "in general,
proportional representation" (www.polity.org.za/html/update/2001). In addition it
argued that smaller parties would be negatively affected by the legislation as it
encourage "cherry-picking" where larger parties offer more attractive positions to
members of smaller parties and so lure them away from their parties
(www.polity.org.zalhtml/udate/2001).
On 3rd and 4th July 2002, the Constitutional Court convened to consider as a matter of
urgency the UDM's application and an appeal by the government against the orders of
the High Court (www.sabcnews.co.za/news/2001).This Court, having heard
argument issued an interim order on 4th July in order to stabilize the political situation,
pending a decision by the Constitutional Court. On the 4th of October 2002 the
Constitutional Court delivered three unanimous judgements concerning the matter
(www.sabcnews.co.za/news/2001). The first of these, the so-called 'UDM interim
judgement', which gave reasons for the interim order of July 4. The second the 'UDM
appeal judgement' upheld an appeal against the order of the Cape High Court and set
it aside. The third, the 'UDM main judgement' addressed the merits of the
constitutional challenge to the legislation and ruled in favour of the justice minister
(Devenish,2000:3).
After the Constitution of South Africa fourth Amendment Act was passed the first
window period (of 15 days) opened, allowing Members of Parliament and Members
of Provincial Legislatures to defect to other parties or form a new party without losing
their seats. Nationally the defections had a significant impact within the National
Assembly, and provincially KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape were the most affected
(www.sabcnews.co.zalnews/2001). The ANC increased its representation in the NA
to 275 thereby gaining a two-thirds majority. The UDM's representation was reduced
from 14 to 4 MPs. The DA also benefited with defections mainly from the NNP
making its representation in the NA to be 46.
According to ACDP MP (NCOP) Kent DUIT,the ACDP had opposed the crossing of
the floor legislation on the basis that it would destabi lise South Africa's political
system and disenfranchise large sections of the public, striking at the heart of the
principle of proportionality. " Both of these effects have occurred," DUITsaid. "There
has been a change of authority and government in cities like Cape Town, provinces
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like the Western Cape and dozens of municipalities. The parliamentary institution of
the National Council of Provinces has also been seriously weakened
(www.polity.org.za/html/update/2001). As members from one party crossed to
another leaving smaller ones like the UDM in the Western Cape with no
representation in the NCOP.
Provincially, the ANC gained outright majority III the Western Cape Legislature
following defections from the NNP and UDM (www.sabcnews.co.za/news/2001).In
KwaZulu-Natal the ANC's alliance with smaller parties increased its representation to
40 seats while the IFP alliance with the DA left them with 38 seats
(www.sabcnews.co.za/news/2001). The floor-crossing legislation provide that twice
in a five-year term MP's, MPLs and Local Government Councillors be given an
opportunity to defect without losing their seats. The table below shows how the floor-
crossing legislation has affected the two provinces. The bold figures in brackets show
the party's loss rather than gain.
Table 4.1
WESTERN CAPE
Party 1999 elections Defectors After floor-crossing
ANC 18 4 22
DA 5 2 7
NNP 17 (6) 10
UDM 1 (1) 0
ACDP 1 1 2
NEW LABOUR 1 1
PARTY
TOTAL 42 42
KW A-ZULU-NATAL
Party 1999 elections Defectors after floor-crossin_g_
ANC 32 3 35
IFP 34 (2) 32
DA 7 ill 6UDM 1 1
NNP 3 (1) 2
ACDP 1 1
MF 2 2
P&DP 1 1
TOTAL 80 80
Source SA BCnews.co.zalnews/200 1/22/02/2005.
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4.2 The NeOp and Intergovernmental relations.
According to Murray & Nijzink (2002:44), some members of the national and
provincial executives think that the NCOP's role in intergovernmental relations is
redundant. This notion is based on the premise that co-operation between provinces
and the national government can take place through intergovernmental forums
established by the executive. Currently, it is in the MinMECs that most productive
discussions of new legislations and policies affecting provinces takes place and not in
the NCOP.
In these forums departmental officials are invited to provide detailed information
relating to policy issues. However, the effectiveness of MinMECs varies and much
depends on the relationship between the national Minister and the MECs. The
implication is that if the Minister and the MEC belong to the same political party it is
unlikely that they'll disagree. And according to Murray & Nijzink (2002:45), "Only in
rare cases where disagreements are resolved in the NCOP, often disagreements are
resolved in MinMECs or party caucuses and not in the NCOP". This smack of
political expediency rather than efficiency for provinces.
The 1998 commissioned Audit Report on intergovernmental relations acknowledged
the role the NCOP play in intergovernmental relations. It said: "In articulating and
promoting provincial interests through the legislature, executive and judicial branches
of government. .. the NCOP is regarded as an important instrument for giving effect to
intergovernmental relations." Conversely, the report lamented what it called the
NCOP's "overloaded, limited resources and disempowering legislative process" (IGR
Audit Report,1998:35). The substance of the critique is that the NCOP is inundated
with work due to its broad mandate in which it scrutinises both section 75 and 76
Bills. Provincial legislatures simply do not have the resources to cope with the
exacting demands of legislative scrutiny or deal with Bills expeditiously within the
legislative cycle.
The report was commissioned by the Department of Local Government to improve
the weak intergovernmental relations between local and the other two spheres of
government. The government's intention was that the system of intergovernmental
relations must result to a seamless government system with all the other spheres
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assisting govemment to set, execute and monitor key development priorities regarding
the creation of work, fighting poverty and re-enforcing national pride. The Audit
Report (1998:58) also noted that: "Poor Inter-Governmental Relations (IGR) co-
ordination is frequently a problem of capacity and management rather than a problem
of inappropriate intergovernmental relations". The report recommended that an
enabling framework for the regulation of IGR in ways that would maintain the
balance between an evolutionary system and the need for prescription.
Five years after in an unprecedented move, President Thabo Mbeki, Cabinet Ministers
and Deputy Ministers, Premiers, Local Government MECs and representatives from
South African Local Government Association met on 25th June to discuss the
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Bill. According to the government's
information website (http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04). the Bill seek to provide
focus, clarity and certainty regarding core aspects of intergovernmental relations at
the executive level of govemment. It does not deal with intergovernmental relations
within the legislative branch of government, the clusters of public administration, or
other clusters associated with cabinet.
The most persistent criticism levelled at the intergovernmental relations process is
that it has eclipsed the NCOP's role (Murray & Nijzink, 2002:64). That is to say,
when legislation comes before the NCOP, provincial interests have already been
articulated by MEC's in the MinMECs or through other IGR processes. As a result,
respondents on the commissioned report felt that little was added to the debate and the
NCOP appeared to them as simply a "rubber stamp" of the National Assembly (IGR
Audit Report, 1998:65).
4.3 Provincial party interests or provinces' interests?
In his address to the NCOP conference in May 1998, the then Deputy President Thabo
Mbeki took provincial executives to task for their failure to participate in NCOP
processes in provincial legislature. " It would appear", he said, "that MECs consider
participation in MinMECs as the sum total of their contribution to the development of
policy and have failed to grasp the significance of the role of the NCOP on
intergovemmental relations" (NCOP Review, 1994-1999:31). In other words, MECs
by undermining the NCOP are also undermining the interests of provinces.
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Some of the reasons cited for this failure is that provincial legislatures do not have the
experience and expertise needed when deliberating on section 76 legislations.
Particularly on how such legislations will impact on the lives of the people of the
province. In most instances, provincial legislatures approve legislation in the NCOP
without having fully examined the capacity of the province to implement such
legislation (NCOP News, March 2000:4). The final product that emerges from
Parliament is impoverished because the kind of co-operation amongst provincial
legislatures and executives, demanded by the Constitution has not happened (NCOP
News, March, 2000:5).
Often, by the time a policy issue reaches the National Council of Provinces, NCOP
delegates had already resolved the matter at their caucuses or at the MinMECs
forums. Deliberations at the NCOP sittings become perfunctory stunts or formalities
meant to meet procedural demands. This also explains why during committee
meetings members limit themselves in identifying printing errors, punctuations,
meanings and definitions of the legislation draft. So that when it comes to assessing
whether the proposed Bill, will be implemented successfully. Instead members simply
satisfy themselves by identifying and acknowledging problems while supporting the
passing of the Bill.
When these Bills are tabled before the NCOP there is enough information for
provinces to articulate their specific provincial interests. Surveys by the Institute of
Race Relation and Statistics South Africa often provide enough scientific evidence
from which provinces can base their arguments. For example the tables below show
how each province rate in terms of crime murders, levels of poverty and
unemployment. With this information, provincial delegates are well informed to make
a huge impact on Bills such as Gun Control and Social Assistance. A reference to
these statistics at least would have indicated that delegates are indeed informed of
their provinces' challenges and that national legislations takes this into account.
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Table 4.3.1
Murder crimes by province for 2000/01 and 2002.
Province 2000/01 2001/02 2000/01/2001/02 (-decrease/+increase).
E. Cape 51.0 51.2 +0.4%
Free State 33.3 32.0 -3.9%
Gauteng 62.2 58.4 -6.1%
KZ-Natal 60.4 57.5 -4.8%
Limpopo 14.6 14.9 -2.1%
Mpumalanga 31.5 29.1 -7.6%
N. West 29.5 29.7 +0.7%
N. Cape 54 ..5 56.1 -8.2%
W. Cape 82.7 79.3 -4.1%
Source: South Africa Survey 2002/2003: SA Race Relations.
Although these murder figures are not broken down to reflect whether they were all or
partly related to guns. Generally, they reflect how the Gun Control Bill will help
reduce murders by province. NCOP delegates do not even by way of insinuating refer
to these figures. They support all the Bills introduced by ministers on the belief that
they are addressing a national problem. Less concerned about the problems that might
be encountered both at provincial level and local level for the successful
implementation of the Act. The fact that some of the Bills are section 76 Bills,
meaning that they require a provincial perspective seem to have little effect in their
deliberations. An example can be made of the Social Assistance Bill of which both
poverty and unemployment levels are related. The figures below show starkly how
each province is affected by these two factors yet none of the NCOP delegates draw
any link between these figures and the Bill.
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Table 4.3.2
Province Poverty levels Unemployment( strict/expanded).
Eastern Cape 4 595 111 28.1%/39.2%
Free State 1549479 33.5%/40.9%
Gauteng 2424471 27%/35.6%
KwaZulu-Natal 5081634 34.3%/46.7%
Limpopo 3471474 36.7%/55.1%
Mpumalanga 1 717922 29.8%/41.7%
North West 2092671 30.7%/46.3%
Northern Cape 392562 30.0%/41.0%
Western Cape 933614 18.6%/25.5%
Source: South Africa Survey 2002/2003: SA Race Relations Surveys
One is therefore left with the notion that very little that the NCOP does to represent
provinces. It is likely that the majority party in the province take advantage of the
situation, where provincial legislatures become party political vehicles. One major
contributory factor to this is that members of the provincial committees where
deliberations and mandates are taken have no pre-existing policy specialisation or
experience of their work (Murray & Nijzink, 2002:48). Thus, it becomes very difficult
for them to develop a proper understanding of the matters that come before their
committees.
The ANC-NCOP Chief Whip, Henry Makgothi in his frank interview (NCOP News,
1998:8) alluded to the fact that there was a tendency among NCOP members during
debates of delivering speeches that have a strong party political bias. According to the
Chief Whip; "This has the potential to undermine provincial mandates ... we must
certainly make sure that the NCOP steers away from being a duplication of the
National Assembly. The temptation among politicians is always there" (NCOP News,
1998:8).
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4.4 Evaluation.
It is clear from the many factors cited above that the role of the NCOP has either not
been fully developed or the institution is simply failing to fulfill its mandate. First as a
mechanism to facilitate intergovernmental relations and secondly as representative of
provincial interests. With regard to the former, the MinMECs fourms where most of
the decisions concerning provinces are taken have relegated the NCOP to merely a
processor of legislations. The idea that the NCOP will harmonise the interests of
provinces through consensus thereby making the legislative process efficient. Has
instead been substituted by political party caucuses, with a political agenda and rarely
with the interest of provinces.
It is no doubt that the idea to amend the Constitution to pass the legislation on floor
crossing was politically motivated. Among other benefits the ruling party expected in
passing the floor-crossing legislation was the total control of all provinces. The
intention was to consolidate its power, and through democratic means entrench the
notion of a unitary state in a one party dominant system. The NCOP, or rather the
provinces supported the passing of this legislation making real the fears that the
institution may just become another rubber stamp like its predecessor.
The fact that the ruling ANC has taken control of all rnne provmces makes the
NCOP's role in representing provinces even more cumbersome. In the presence of a
weak opposition this is even more dangerous. It is indeed unlikely that Ministers,
Premiers and NCOP delegates in the MinMECs forums from the same political party
will disagree. This best explains Murray's (2002: 63) concelll that only on rare cases
where disagreement are resolved in the NCOP, in most cases they are resolved in the
MinMEC's forums or other intergovernmental relations structures.
With all the nine provinces under the ruling ANC and judging from the NCOP's
reduntant role in intergovernmental relations, all things point to one direction. The
possibility that the NCOP may become a rubber stamp of Bills paased by the first
house looms large. Until of course measures are taken to avoid this scenario as the
former Chairperson of the NCOP once said;
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"We should have a claer means of engaging with provincial legislatures. Our
relationship with provincial legislatures should not be a top down one where
the NCOP members go to brief provinces as though we are legal people going
to brief provinces. If the memoranda sets out the impact on provinces, from
this perspective we have a clear set of criteria to conduct a real investigation. I
believe that if we are to really represent the provincial interests, we must know
what we are representing. I feel at the moment we are not asking the harder
questions and carrying out the detailed investigations that are required"
(NCOP News, 1999:5).
It is obvious for the NCOP that to improve its image, role and status to the public it
will have to show by way of disagreeing with the National Assembly particularly on
section 76 Bills. This might be too demanding for the institution. However, only then
will the institution gain the confidence of the public and in tum take it seriously.
Currently, it has a low profile merely because it never draw the public's attention by
vigoriously articulating the interests of provinces on any Bills so far.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION.
5.1 Summary of the main findings.
The introduction of the NCOP by the 1996 constitution heralded a new era for South
Africa's political system. It formed part of the non-federal unitary state of the
Republic and part of the second sphere of South Africa's government system. Serving
as a link between the national and local government spheres. lts role as described by
the Constitution, mainly to represent the interests of provinces at national level. To
ensure that provincial needs and concerns are taken into account in the formulation
and passing of national legislation.
The study has revealed that the NCOP has battled not only to establish itself but also
to fulfil its mandate. Mainly becuase it is a relatively new institution and its process
very complicated (Murray & Nijzinsk, 2002:42). Secondly, it suffers problems of both
internal credibility, where South African politicians and policy-makers alike pay little
attention to it, and external legitimacy, where the public does not see it performing a
useful role. In general the NCOP has little or no profile in the framework of South
Africa's democratic process.
This obscurity is augmented in some way by the manner in which the organisational
structure of the NCOP functions. This includes untimely programmes, characterised
by changes at short notice, poor communication from national parliament to provinces
and ministers who change their schedules whenever it is convenient for them to do so.
These problems have contributed to the poor functioning of the NCOP and also
affecting the institution in fulfilling its mandate. In some cases the institution has been
undermined by structures unaccountable to the public, like the ruling party's caucus
meetings and MinMECs who have relegated the body into a mere processor of
legislations.
The possibility that the NCOP might degenerate into a rubber-stamp mechanism
similar to its predecessor remains a potent possibility. There are a number of reasons
why this may happen. First, the growing dominance of the ANC in South African
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politics will make it difficult to distinguish between party and provincial interests.
Secondly, there are no constitutional provisions that give official opposition veto at
provincial level to at least review the mandates issued by the provincial majority
party. In the period covered by the study (between 1999 and 2003) there hasn't been
one instance where the NCOP rejected a Bill referred to it by the NA, this include
section 76 Bills and that remains a worrying trend.
5.2 Fulfilling the mandate'!
Based on the findings of the study, it is rather prematurely to conclude that the NCOP
fulfills its constitutional mandate in representing the interests of provinces at national
level. There are reasons why this is so; in the period covered by the study the NCOP
was in its second term of parliament. According to its members it was "work in
progress". The problems it was confronted with according to President Thabo Mbeki
were regarded as "teething problems"(Speech Conference, 8 May 1998).
In tum criticism levelled against the institution has been viewed as improper and
unfair since the institution is regarded as developmental in character and unique in
essence. In other words, it has no prototype around in which it can measure itself
except in terms of legislative powers. Accordingly, unless the NCOP is given more
legislative constitutional powers, such as veto over Bills affecting province. lts role to
represent provinces will remain ineffective except as a rubber stamp of Bills passed
by the NA. Thus, the NCOP will need to improve its role either by demanding more
constitutional powers or by being vigilant on Bills affecting provinces. In the period
covered by the study the NCOP showed signs that it might easily allow itself to
become a 'rubber stamp' of Bills passed by the first house.
Importantly, there's a great possiblity that MinMECs forums might contribute
immensely in turning the NCOP to a 'rubber stamp' mechanism. If decisions
concerning provinces are to be decided at party caucuses and in structures such as
MinMECs, the NCOP cannot fulfill its mandate other than being a rubber stamp. In
overall, the NCOP need to do more than just passing Bills; a thoughrough
investigation of what constitute provincial interests as the former NCOP Chairperson
Naledi Pandor once pointed out that; " ...if we are to really represent the provincial
interests, we must know what we are representing" (NCOP News, 1999:5).
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5.3 Abolition or reform of the NCOP.
As a constitutionally constituted body it is clear that the NCOP will remain with us
for a long time to come. Secondly, the institution itself was an outcome of
negotiations of the future government system of the country prior to 1994 between the
advocates of federalism and unitarians. Judging from the current situation it would
seem that those who advocated a unitary state are on the winning side. With the ruling
ANC in full control of the nine provinces it is unlikely that any suggestions to the
abolition of the NCOP will see the light of day.
The one option however would be the reformation of the institution. There is no doubt
that the nine different provinces have different interest economically and otherwise.
This however can hardly be revealed since only one political party control all the nine
provinces. The first step toward reforming the institution would be at constitutional
level. Instead of boasting about its uniqueness the NCOP must follow the example of
the German Bundesrat where the second house has veto on all Bills affecting the
federal states.
To have real meaning and to counter the power of a one party dominant state, official
opposition at provincial level must have veto over mandates on Bills affecting
provinces. The constitution must specify excatly when and how such veto must be
exercised to avoid party political objectives being carried out by opposition parties.
Other than that, provincial legislatures must be elected directly by the electorate
instead of the party list. This will then make NCOP delegates accountable to the
electorate rather than their chief whips and party bosses.
Delegates will then come to terms with the fact that if they fail to represent the
interests of their respective provinces they will be voted out of power in the next
elections. Not only this will reform the NCOP and boost its profile to the public, but it
will also stregthen our democratic ethos and solidify our vision for a truly democratic
South Africa.
5.4. Recommendations.
Based on the findings of the study the following recommendations are provided:
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5.4.1 Progress report on the NCOP.
To satisfy all the relevant stake-holders on the NCOP progress since its inception. A
progress report on whether the NCOP has been able to fulfill its role in representing
provinces must be conducted.
5.4.2 lntergovern mental relations.
The concept of intergovernmental relations seem to have a negative effect on the
NCOP's role in representing provincial interests. Practically, there seem to be a
contlict between representing nine different provinces and harmonising their interests
through intergovernmental relations processes. This explain why major decisions
concerning Bills affecting provinces are taken in MinMECs. The government need to
review the role of MinMECs forums to avoid hindering the NCOP in fulfilling its
mandate. The former is not constituted by the constitution and has no specific
mandate.
5.4.2 Commitment.
It would be in the interests of the ruling ANC to guard itself from the evils of absolute
power. The axiom that, "power tend to corrupt and absolute power corrupts
absolutely" tends to be real where weak opposition exist (Collins, 1992:23). With this
in mind the ANC will have to commit itself and its members to the constitutional
provisions of our constitution and be an example to all the other parties. To do this, it
must do everything in its power to give meaning to the NCOP as a true representative
of provinces.
5.4.3 NCOP profile.
The low profile suffered by the NCOP can only be improved by the NCOP members
themeselves. Provincial outreaches in the form of 1mbizos apperently have done very
little to publicise the NCOP. The institution need to work with NGOs whose area of
work include parliament and the legislature to publicise the institution and explain its
role within parliament to the general public by means of booklets or workshops.
5.4.4 Public access.
Provincial legislatures need to develop ways in which the public can have easy access
to their sittings. For indeed, unless people from provinces put pressure on the NCOP
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or their delegates, the issue of provincial interests will remain an exclusive preserve of
the party in control of the provincial legislature - with little or no accountability to the
people in the province.
4.5 Programming.
There's no doubt that one way or the other poor programming and communication
between national parliament and provinces has had a negative effect on provincial
delegates' preparation for deliberation in the NCOP. Thus, commitment to the
institution must include improved programming and communication between
parliament and provinces on a continuous basis.
4.6 Provincial interests.
Before the NCOP was established, the fear was that it might become another version
of the senate with no meaningful role except that of rubbber-stamping Bills reffered to
it by the NA. That fear has not been proved unjustified, because the NCOP's vote (as
the study has shown) has never differed from that of the NA. In the period covered by
the study the NCOP has never rejected the NA version (Brandt, 2001 :72). To
improve this situation more thoughrough study of what constitute provincial interests
must be undertaken with the participation of local government structures to help
identify provincial intersts.
69
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Blair, N. George (1967): American Legislatures: Structure and Process. Harper &
Row Publishers, Incorperated, 49 East 33rd Street, New York.
Bernard, Manin (1997): The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Bogdanor, Vernon (1987): The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Science.
Blackwell Reference.
Brandt, M. L (2001): "From the Senate to the NCOP: Adescription of the
Composition and Working of South Africa's Second Chamber", MPhil Dissertation,
University of Stellenbosch, Department of Political Studies.South Africa.
Bridgman, M (1999): "Mapping the contours of US policy towards Post-apartheid
South Africa, Dissertation for Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Political Science.
University of Stellenbosch. South Africa.
Cishe, A. L (2001): "Improving the Effectiveness of the Mpumalanga Representation
in the NCOP", MPA Dissertation, University of Stellenbosch, Department of Public
Administration. South Africa.
Chakalson, M & Spitz, R (2000): Politics of Transition: The Hidden History of South
Africa's Negotiated Settlement, Wits University Press, South Africa.
Collins, Peter (1992): Ideology after the fall of Communism. Briefings, Oxford
University Press, London, New York.
Concise Oxford Dictionary (1996), Oxford Publication Press.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108, 1996, Government Print
Publications.
70
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Department of Local Government and Provincial Affairs (1999). "Towards a Culture
of Co-operative Government", The Intergovernmental Relations Audit Report, South
Africa.
Devenish, Ge (1998): Commentary on the South African Constitution. Butterworth
Publishers (Pty) Ltd. Durban, 8 Walter Place Mayville 4091, South Africa.
Devenish, Ge (2000): "Political Musical Chairs: The Saga of Floor-crossing and the
Constitution". University of KwaZulu-Natal Faculty of Law, Law Seminar Series:
Papers, South Africa.
Erasmus, Gerhard (1997): "The NCOP has considerable potential for affecting
cooperation between national and provincial governments". Intlola, November-
December 1997, Vol 1 No 748. Newsletter of the Legislative Training Programme.
Department of Political Studies, School of Governance, University of the Western
Cape, South Africa.
Friedman, S (1997): "Powers to the Provinces". Seminar article delivered at the
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), Spin Street, Cape Town, South
Africa.
Hansard, 14 to 19 September 2000 Debates of the National Council of Provinces,
Second Parliament, South African Parliament.
Hansard, 6 to 8 June 2000 Debates of the National Council of Provinces. Second
Parliament, South African Parliament.
Haysom, N (1998): Constitutional Law, Butterworth Publishers, (Pty) Ltd, South
Africa.
Heywood, A (1997): Introduction to Politics, Pelgrave Series Publication, Houndmills
Basingstaker, Hampshire 175 fifth Avenue, New York.
Henderson, et al (2003): South African Survey 2002/2003: South Africa Race
Relations, Printed and bound by Creda Communications, Cape Town, South Africa.
71
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Humphries & Meierhenrich (1996): "Is there a role for second chambers? Indicator,
South Africa, Vol 13 No.4.
Johnson J, & Joslyn R (1995): Political Science Research Methods. Third edition,
Washington D. C. Congressional Quarterly Press.
Jung & Shapiro, I (1997): Democracy's Place. Shapiro & Jung, Ithaca Publication,
New York.
Kriek, D. J et al (1992): Federalism: The Solution? Printed and bound by Sigma
Press (Pty) Ltd, Pretoria.
Lijphart, Arend (1999): Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance
in Thirty-six Countries. Yale University Press, USA.
Manin, Bernard (1997): The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Mezey, Micheal 1990): "Classifying legislatures", in Legislatures, (ed) Philip Norton
(Published in the United States by Oxford University Press.
Mohamed, Bhabha (1996): "Drafting legislation III the South African
Parliament:Constrains". In Parliamentary Dynamics: Understanding Political life in
the South African Parliament.(Ed) Hennie Kotze
Mouton, J (1999): How to Succeed in your Master's and Doctoral Studies: A South
African Guide and Resource Book, VanSchaik Publishers, South Africa.
Murray, C & Nijzink, L. (2002): Building Representative Democracy: South Africa's
Legislatures and the Constitution, Published by the Parliamentary Support
Programme Funded by the European Commission.
72
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Murray, Christina (1997): "Two ctitical areas in the realm of political participation
needed for NCOP to consolidate it's position as a centre for decision making". Intlola,
November-December, Vol 1, No 748. Newsletter of the Legislative Training
Programme. Department of Political Studies, School of Governance, University of the
Western Cape, South Africa.
Neop News, March 1999 " Marking the close of the first democratically elected
parliament". Newsletter of the National Council of Province, South Africa.
NCOP News, September 1999 "Forging new partnership" Newsletter of the National
Council of Provinces, South Africa.
NCOP National Conference 8/9 May 1998. Report of the Provinces. Where to now?,
Workshop, Medicina Conference Centre, Parow, Cape Town, South Africa
NCOP National Conference 8/9 May 1998. Report of the legislatures and oversight
function workshop. Medicina Conference Centre, Parow, Cape Town, South Africa.
NCOP REVIEW 1996-1999, Published by the NCOP in Association with the National
Democratic Institute fo Internation Affairs (NDl), South African Parliament.
NCOP News, August 2000: "The NCOP's Second Term". Newsletter of the National
Council of Provinces, South African Parliament.
NCOP Rules Document, (1998), Hansard, Republic of South Africa, Parliamentary
Publication, South African Parliament.
New National Party Parliamentary Audit (1997), December, Printed and Published by
the NNP Communication Desk, Cape Town.
Nsingo, M (1997): "A Critical Analysis of the Demarcation of Zimbabwe's Central
Districts". Phd Dissertation, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape
Town. South Africa.
73
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Parliamentary Whip, 5 June 1998. Published by Idasa's Political and Information and
Monitoring Service, South Africa.
Parliamentary Whip, 18 September 1998. Published by Idasa's Political Information
and Monitoring Service, South Africa.
Polsby, N. W (1990): "Legislatures", in Legislatures, (ed) Philip Norton, Published in
the United States by Oxford University Press.
Rieselbach, Leroy N. (1990): The Evolving legislative System. Indiana University 2nd
edition, Westview Press, Boulder. San Francisco, Oxford.
Spitz, R & Chakalson, M (2000): Politics of Transition: The Hidden History of South
Africa's Negotiated Settlement, Wits University Press, South Africa.
Tsebilis, George & Jeannette Money (1997): Bicameralism, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Wehner, Joachim (1998): "What is the Future of South Africa's Provinces?"
Discussion Paper Series. Applied Fiscal Research Centre (AFREC), University of
Cape Town Budget Project
Internet sites.
Minutes of the select committee on Safety and Security (NCOP).
Http://www.pmg.org.za/archive/committees/1999
Visited 18 June 2004.
Minutes ofthe seclect committee on Education and Recreation (NCOP).
Http://www.pmg.org.za/archive/ committees/2000
Visited 18 June 2004.
Minutes of the select committee on Local Government and Provincial Affairs
(NCOP). Http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/200 1
Visited 16 April 2004.
74
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Trevor Brown (2004): " The Bundesrat and second chambers III comparitive
perspective ..Http://www.wordiq.comldefinitionlbundesrat_ Germany
Visited 04 April 2004
Minutes of the select committee on Finance (NCOP).
Http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/2002
Visited 07 July 2004.
Minutes of the select committee on Social Service and Development (NCOP).
Http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/2003
Visited 02 September 2004.
Draft Bill, Guns Control.
Http://www.polity.org.za/html/ govdocs/bills/ 19999
Visited 03 September 2004.
Draft Bill, Adult and Basic Education and Training.
Http://www.polity.org.za/html /govdocs/bills/2000
Visited 08 September 2004.
Draft Bill, Disaster Management Bill.
Http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/bills/200 1
Visited 18 November 2004.
Draft Bill, Division of Revenue.
Http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/bills/2002
Visited 18 November 2004.
Draft Bill, Social Assistance.
Http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/bills/2003
Visited 25 November 2004.
"Floor-crossing and the Constitution".
75
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Http://www.sabcnews.co.za/news/2000 1
Visited 22 February 2005
"Political changes as floor-crossing looms"
Http://www.polity.org.za/htmllupdate/200 1
Visited 22 February 2005.
76
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
